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Fairness Opinions
Abstract

This Article re-examines the fairness opinion, as well as its role and necessity in corporate control transactions.
This Article argues that today's fairness opinion regime is deeply flawed and, as a consequence, a fairness
opinion has little meaning. The reasons are primarily this: the financial analyses underlying fairness opinions,
as currently prepared by investment banks, are prone to excessive subjectivity and are frequently the product
of valuation techniques that are not in accord with best practices. These defects are exacerbated by the
recurring problem of these same investment banks who are conflicted in their provision of these opinions.
Meanwhile, SEC and FINRA regulation of fairness opinions does not adequately address these fundamental
issues while the Delaware courts continue to periodically reassert, without question, Smith v. Van Gorkom's
implicit fairness opinion requirement, thereby bestowing excessive significance to the fairness opinion. This
Article, though, does not call for the fairness opinion's death. Rather, I argue that the fairness opinion regime
should be reformed through a quasi-public, standard-setting body. Creation of this body and its adoption of
standards and guidelines for preparation of a fairness opinion and its undergirding financial analyses, as well as
heightened disclosure requirements, should enhance the economics and usefulness of the fairness opinion by
reducing subjectivity in valuation, ensuring proper grounding and permitting increased market scrutiny.
Implementation of these reforms would also do more to alleviate the related and repeatedly cited problem of
investment bank conflicts of interest than prior disclosure-based and other proposals. If these reforms are
adopted, the fairness opinion, in and of itself, is still not a panacea. It will always be an inferior substitute for a
market-based approach to determine the fairness of the consideration in a corporate control transaction.
However, a valuation conducted with rigor and in accordance with disclosed standards and guidelines can
inform materially as to value when a market-based price is unavailable or unobtainable. In such a context, a
fairness opinion can have meaning. Even in such situations, though, the inherent limitations of state-of-the-art
valuation should be recognized; a fairness opinion should only be one of many tools to assist a board in
gauging what is a fair price. The Delaware courts should recognize this, repudiating Van Gorkom's wholesale,
implicit fairness opinion requirement when the agreed price is a market-based one. In other circumstances, a
fairness opinion should not be required, but if received, should be considered by the Delaware courts as only
one indicative factor to be utilized in assessing a board's satisfaction of its duty of care.
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INTRODUCTION
A fairness opinion is an opinion provided by an outside advisor,
usually, though not necessarily, an investment bank, that a
transaction meets a threshold level of fairness from a financial
perspective.
Typically, these opinions are rendered to a
corporation’s board of directors, or a committee thereof, in
connection with a corporate control transaction such as a sale,
1
2
leveraged buy-out,
leveraged recapitalization,
going-private
3
4
transaction, or otherwise. The board will rely on this opinion to
1. A leveraged buy-out is the acquisition for cash of the outstanding stock of a
publicly traded corporation. The cash consideration is principally obtained through
debt financing secured by the assets of the acquired corporation. See generally Tom
Ablum & Mary Beth Burgis, Leveraged Buy-outs: The Ever Changing Landscape, 13
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 109, 109-14 (2000/2001) (discussing the history and parameters of
leveraged buy-outs in the United States); Bill Shaw & Edward J. Gac, Fairness Opinions
in Leveraged Buy-outs: Should Investment Bankers Be Directly Liable to Shareholders?, 23
SEC. REG. L.J. 293 (1995) (discussing the use of fairness opinions in leveraged buyouts).
2. A leveraged recapitalization is similar to a leveraged buy-out except that, in
addition to cash consideration for their shares, the public stockholders of the
corporation receive equity in the post-transaction, leveraged corporation. See
generally Franci J. Blassberg & Peter J. Shabecoff, Structuring Issues for Financial
Sponsors in Leveraged Recapitalization Transactions, in 2 ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE
PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY 2004, at 371 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. B-1432, 2004) (discussing the structure of a leveraged recapitalization).
The public stockholders retain a smaller aggregate interest in the equity of the
corporation with the remaining equity held by the arranging participants of the
recapitalization, typically management or a financial sponsor. Id.
3. A going-private transaction can be defined as one where an affiliate of a
publicly held corporation (e.g., a member of management or a controlling
stockholder) acquires the remaining corporate equity.
Consequently, the
corporation becomes “private,” and its equity is no longer publicly traded. See also 17
C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2001) (setting forth the federal securities law definition of a
going-private transaction). See generally Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Revisiting
Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma Post—Pure Resources, 59 BUS. LAW. 1459 (2004)
(discussing recent Delaware case law with respect to going-private transactions);
Michael J. McGuinness & Timo Rehbock, Going-Private Transactions: A Practitioner’s
Guide, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437 (2005) (describing the legal regulation of going-private
transactions).
4. Corporate control transactions can also be defined as those fulfilling the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) definition of a takeover set forth in
Rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (2006), promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended (the “Securities Act”). 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 77a-77aa (2006). Rule 145 sets
forth the federal securities law definition of a takeover transaction for purposes of an
offer, offer to sell, offer for sale, or sale under the Securities Act when “there is
submitted to security holders a plan or agreement pursuant to which such holders
are required to elect, on the basis of what is in substance a new investment decision,
whether to accept a new or different security in exchange for their existing security.”
17 C.F.R. § 230.145, preliminary note (2006). This is an overly broad definition for a
corporate control transaction since it encompasses merger transactions that do not
constitute a change of control for either party. The definition is also narrow since it
excludes transactions that do not involve securities consideration. A corporate
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satisfy its duty of care in the determination of whether or not to
5
proceed. There are other paradigms in which fairness opinions are
utilized; however, the thrust of this Article is focused upon the use of
6
such opinions by acquirees in a corporate control transaction.
In the mid-1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van
7
Gorkom placed heavy reliance on the lack of a fairness opinion or
other reliable valuation in a corporate control transaction to sustain a
8
holding that an acquiree board breached its duty of care. From this
control transaction for purposes of this Article can be simply defined as a
transaction, or series of related transactions, which constitute a transfer of control of
a corporation or all, or substantially all, of its assets.
5. A board is subject under Delaware law to a fiduciary duty of care. In a
corporate control transaction, this requires the board to “inform themselves fully and
in a deliberate manner before voting” on a corporate control transaction. Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993) (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)). This more specifically obligates a board to apprise
itself “of all material information reasonably available to them.” Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 858, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by
Brehm v. Eisner, 716 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)). A plaintiff asserting a breach of this
duty of care must establish that the board was grossly negligent in the referenced
decision. Id. at 873. Simple negligence is insufficient. Id. A failure to establish gross
negligence when asserting a breach of the duty of care will lead the Delaware courts
to apply the business judgment rule; consequently, the courts will not second guess
this business decision. See Cede, 634 A.2d at 361. See generally Craig W. Palm & Mark
A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of Directors’ Duties in Delaware: The Rules of the Game
(Part I), 40 VILL. L. REV. 1297, 1307-08 (1995) (outlining the duty of care and the
standard for breach thereof under Delaware law). To date, Van Gorkom is the leading
Delaware case on the duty of care in the corporate control context. See discussion of
case and its holding infra Part I.B; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,
2006 WL 1562466 (Del. 2006) (discussing scope of duty of care and the board
decision-making process outside of the corporate control context).
6. Fairness opinions are also utilized in other corporate transactions to assist a
board in setting price when conflicts of interest arguably exist, which require such
additional aid or when a general need for information as to value is desirable. For
example, fairness opinions are routinely provided in connection with split-offs and
spin-offs. See, e.g., Rosser v. New Valley Corp., 2005 WL 1364624, at *3 (Del. Ch.
2005) (fairness opinion obtained in connection with recapitalization); Gen. Motors,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at E-2 (Aug. 21, 2003) (four fairness
opinions obtained in connection with the split-off of Hughes Electronics by General
Motors); see also Thomas Patrick Dore, Jr. & Peter Pattison, Fairness Opinions in
Corporate Real Estate Transactions, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 27, 2002, at 4 (advocating use of
fairness opinions in real estate transactions). However, the primary use of fairness
opinions today is within the corporate control transaction. See generally Charles M.
Elson et al., Fairness Opinions—Can They Be Made Useful?, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
1984 (Nov. 24, 2003) (setting forth illustrative corporate transactions wherein
fairness opinions are typically rendered) [hereinafter Elson, Can They Be Made
Useful?].
7. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
8. See discussion of case and its holding infra at Part I.B. Corporate law in the
United States is principally set by state law applied to a corporation based on its situs
of incorporation. This Article focuses primarily on the general corporate law of
Delaware when discussing state law and applicable governing corporate law. This is
because Delaware is the principal and preferred place of incorporation for the
majority of public corporations in the United States and is viewed as the national
standard-setter for regulation of public corporations. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
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singular act, academics and practitioners inferred and concluded,
perhaps rightfully, that a fairness opinion was a virtually mandatory
requirement for an acquiree board, or committee thereof, making a
9
corporate control decision. This was their practical conclusion.
However, their critical response was heated, almost visceral in nature.
Immediately after Van Gorkom and through the early 1990s, fairness
opinions were derided as, among other things, conflict-ridden,
10
subjective, rubber-stamps, meaningless, and hackneyed. This burst
of criticism dissipated as the Delaware courts continued to place
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over
Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554 (2002) (stating Delaware “plays a central role
in setting corporate governance rules for the nation’s publicly traded companies”);
Website of Delaware Division of Corporations, http://www.state.de.us/corp/ (last
visited May 27, 2006) (noting that “more than 50% of all U.S. publicly traded
companies and 60% of the Fortune 500” are incorporated in Delaware). For this
reason, and Delaware’s perceived, well-qualified judiciary, Delaware courts regularly
address major corporate law issues facing publicly traded corporations, and Delaware
is therefore generally regarded to have the most trenchant case law. See E. Norman
Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and
Governance From 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1399, 1399-1411 (2005) (discussing the primacy of Delaware case-law in addressing
corporate governance and related issues).
9. E.g., Michael J. Kennedy, Functional Fairness—The Mechanics, Functions and
Liabilities of Fairness Opinions, in HANDLING HIGH-TECH M&AS IN A COOLING MARKET:
ENSURING THAT YOU GET VALUE, at 605, 607 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. B-1255, 2001) (noting that fairness opinions are delivered “in
almost any transaction of note involving public companies”); Daniel R. Fischel, The
Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1453 (1985)
(asserting that after Van Gorkom, “no firm considering a fundamental corporate
change will do so without obtaining a fairness letter”); Shaw & Gac, supra note 1, at
293 (“Over the last decade, the fairness opinion has become a necessary and integral
aspect of every major corporate control transaction.”); Andre Ross Sorkin, A Dual
Role for Lehman in Deal Talks, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2005, at C1 (noting as unusual the
lack of a fairness opinion in the proposed transaction).
10. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair
Are They and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 29-38 (1989) (discussing
the substantial preparer discretion with respect to a fairness opinion) [hereinafter
Elson, Are They Fair]; William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and Why
We Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523, 532-37 (1992) (criticizing
fairness opinions for lack of precision and inability to predict price); Charles M.
Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or Should We Care?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 951, 952-70
(1992) (criticizing fairness opinions for having “dubious” value); Michael W. Martin,
Note, Fairness Opinions and Negligent Misrepresentation: Defining Investment Bankers’
Duty to Third-Party Shareholders, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 133, 140-41 (1991) (“[D]uring the
mergers-and-acquisitions boom of the 1980s, the rendering of a fairness opinion
became a mere formality performed after a deal was structured.”); Dale Arthur
Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder
Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 214 (1988) (“[T]he chicanery of using made-to-order
fairness opinions is probably widespread.”); see also Bernard Black & Reinier
Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U.
L. REV. 521, 555-57 (2002) (criticizing fairness opinions for their “doubtful” value);
Elson, Can They Be Made Useful?, supra note 6, at 2-3 (discussing various criticisms of
investment bank fairness opinions); David Henry, A Fair Deal—But for Whom?, BUS.
WK., Nov. 24, 2003, at 108 (criticizing investment banks rendering fairness opinions
for lack of objectivity and conflicts of interest).
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persuasive reliance on fairness opinions and intermittently reasserted
their implicit requirement for an acquiree fairness opinion in a
11
corporate control transaction. Today, the fairness opinion survives
and thrives, earning investment banks millions, if not billions, of
12
dollars yearly.
This Article re-examines the fairness opinion, as well as its role and
necessity. Corporate law and regulation, as well as attitudes with
respect thereto, have advanced from the hallmark time of Van
13
Gorkom. Finance, a young discipline, has also progressed markedly,
and previously held assumptions and methodologies have been
14
rejected, refined, or revised. This Article also analyzes the fairness
15
I
opinion in light of these developments in law and finance.
11. See infra notes 219-226 and accompanying text.
12. One recent empirical study analyzed a significant sample of merger and
acquisition transactions announced between 1994 and 2003 and found that a fairness
opinion had been provided to approximately eighty percent of acquirees and thirtyseven percent of acquirers. See Darren J. Kisgen et al., Are Fairness Opinions Fair? The
Case of Mergers and Acquisitions (Apr. 12, 2006), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=901475; see also Helen M. Bowers, Fairness Opinions and the Business
Judgment Rule: An Empirical Investigation of Target Firms’ Use of Fairness Opinions, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 567, 577-78 (2002) (detailing an empirical study which found that
approximately sixty-one percent of acquiree firms in selected, post-Van Gorkom
corporate control transactions reported receipt of a fairness opinion, while over
ninety percent of firms during this period disclosed that they had engaged a
financial advisor for the transaction).
13. This is particularly true in the post-Enron/Worldcom universe. For a
discussion of this heightened scrutiny of corporate actions and increased regulation
of corporations post-Enron/Worldcom, see, inter alia, William B. Chandler III & Leo
E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System:
Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003)
(discussing possible corporate governance and regulatory reforms in the 21st
century); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron,
Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579 (2002) (tracing the
development of post-Enron/Worldcom reforms and arguing for increased legal
corporate reform based on core American values of equality and meritocracy);
Gretchen Morgenson, An Emboldened Investor Class Is Not Likely to Go Away Soon, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at C1 (reporting increased supervision of corporate practices by
stockholders post-Enron/Worldcom).
14. For a history of these developments, see generally JONATHON BARRON BASKIN &
PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1997); RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, at 995-98 (7th Int’l ed. 2003);
SHANNON P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING A BUSINESS 4-18 (4th ed. 2000).
15. Criticism and review of the fairness opinion has, in recent years, percolated
into the public realm. Elliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the state of New York,
stated publicly in 2003 that an inquiry should be made of investment bank fairness
opinion practices. To date, though, his office has not taken any public action. See
Patrick J. Leddy & Randall M. Walters, The Growing Storm over Fairness Opinions,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J., Mar. 2005, at 35-36. Additionally, there has been a
recent investigation into fairness opinion practices by the Massachusetts Secretary of
the Commonwealth and regulatory action by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (“NASD”). The investigation of the Massachusetts Secretary of the
Commonwealth is discussed infra note 164 and accompanying text. The new
proposed NASD regulation is discussed infra at Part III.B. See also Ann Davis, Wall
Street’s ‘Fairness Opinions’ Draw Fire from Calpers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2005, at C1
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conclude that current fairness opinion practice is still deeply flawed.
Fairness opinions, and their underlying valuation analyses, are prone
to subjectivity and are frequently prepared utilizing methodologies
16
that simply do not jibe with best practices.
These defects are
exacerbated by the recurring problem of investment banks who are
17
conflicted in their provision of fairness opinions.
This Article, however, does not call for the fairness opinion’s
death. Rather, I argue for a conditioned place in corporate control
transactions, albeit legally diminished, for the fairness opinion. The
pre-condition is the remedy of current defects through revision in the
practice and requirements of fairness opinion preparation, form, and
disclosure. These suggested reforms should be implemented in a
practical manner through a quasi-public, standard-setting body.
Creation of this body and adoption of guidelines and standards,
should also reduce the subjectivity and increase the reliability of
fairness opinions enhancing their signaling, screening and
informational qualities. Implementation of these reforms would also
do more to alleviate the related and repeatedly cited problem of
investment bank conflicts-of-interest than prior disclosure-based
18
proposals.
Even if these proposals are adopted, the fairness opinion, in and of
itself, is not a panacea. For two reasons, it will always be an inferior
substitute for a market-based approach to determine the fairness of
the consideration in a corporate control transaction. First, valuation
analysis, even if disciplined, can only inform as to value. It will never
definitively predict price—only the market can do this. Second, a fair
price from the acquiree stockholder perspective is one that is set
through an effective market-based process. Accordingly, a fairness
opinion in a corporate control transaction, from the perspective of
the acquiree’s stockholders, could arguably be defined as an opinion
that an offered price is within a minimum range that otherwise would
19
have been obtained in such a market-based process.
A fairness
opinion becomes redundant, at best, if such process is adhered to,

(reporting that the California Public Employees Retirement System is now
recommending that investment banks be prohibited from issuing fairness opinions
when also providing general financial advice).
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part IV.B.3.
19. Cf. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 31 (stating that some consider fair
price in a corporate control transaction to be the price that acquiree stockholders
would receive through an auction-process).
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and a reformed fairness opinion will always be an imperfect substitute
for an effective market-based price.
However, a valuation conducted with rigor and in accordance with
disclosed guidelines and standards can materially inform as to value.
It is for this reason that, provided reform comes, a fairness opinion,
and its underlying valuation analyses, can still have utility whenever
an effective market-based price is unobtainable.
In such
circumstances, a fairness opinion can inform the board in satisfaction
of its duty of care by providing confidence that the consideration
offered is commensurate with a minimum price range achievable in
the functioning market. Even in such situations, though, the
inherent limitations of state-of-the-art valuation should be
recognized; a fairness opinion should only be one of many tools to
assist a board in gauging what is a “fair” price. The Delaware courts
should recognize this, repudiating Van Gorkom’s wholesale, implicit
fairness opinion requirement when the agreed price is a marketbased one. In other circumstances, a fairness opinion should not be
required, but if received, it should be considered by the Delaware
courts as only one indicative factor used to assess a board’s
20
satisfaction of its duty of care.
Part I of this Article examines the fairness opinion; its scope,
purpose, form and judicially-spurred adoption. Part II discusses the
perceived flaws and tension points in the reliance upon fairness
opinions in corporate control transactions. This Part examines the
indeterminate qualities of valuation as well as the current
problematical practices and conflicted status of investment banks in
the preparation and rendering of fairness opinions. Part III surveys
the response of various corporate regulators, the Delaware judiciary,
and academics to the fairness opinion and its increased utilization
post-Van Gorkom. Part IV proposes needed legal reform to today’s
existent fairness opinion regime.

I.

RISE OF THE FAIRNESS OPINION

A. The Fairness Opinion—Scope, Purpose, and Form
In the corporate control transaction, a fairness opinion is typically
provided to a board, or a committee thereof, at the time of its
21
consideration of the relevant transaction. The fairness opinion is
20. See infra Part IV.A.
21. This permits a board to properly assess, under its duty of care, the fairness
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usually delivered orally at this meeting by the investment bankers in
attendance and confirmed in a subsequent, written letter addressed
22
to the board from the investment bank. This two or three page
letter also sets forth the transaction terms, as well as the qualifications
and assumptions underlying the investment bank’s fairness
23
determination.
In fact, this is the letter’s primary purpose, to
manage and restrict the investment bank’s liability for rendering the
opinion: the laundry list of qualifications and assumptions is the bulk
24
of the text. It is only at the letter’s end, in one sentence, wherein

opinion and any related information at or before the time of its decision to enter
into a corporate control transaction. Cf. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881
(Del. 1985) (holding that Trans Union’s Board was grossly negligent because it failed
to act with informed deliberation before agreeing to a corporate control
transaction). However, fairness opinions are sometimes rendered after the board’s
decision and corporation’s agreement to enter into the transaction. See Andrew L.
Bab, Collins and the Pitfalls of Post-Signing Fairness Opinions, 14 INSIGHTS 16, 17-18
(Dec. 2000) (outlining three circumstances under which post-signing fairness
opinions are sought: in cases of substantial change, upon board request, and as a
closing condition to a transaction agreement). A fairness opinion is typically
provided in such situations to account for changed circumstances and to revalidate
the consideration offered. See, e.g., Worldwide Rest. Concepts, Inc., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Form 14A), at cover page (Aug. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Worldwide Proxy
Statement] (disclosing that board requested its investment bank to “issue an update
to its previously issued fairness opinion in the form of a ‘bring-down’ opinion so that
the stockholders will have updated information available for consideration prior to
the vote”). Such an opinion is not necessarily a legal requirement under Delaware
law unless the board obtains information that the previously rendered opinion is no
longer true or otherwise cannot be maintained. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2003
WL 21003437, at *26 (Del. Ch. 2003) (affirming board decision not to obtain
updated fairness opinion), aff’d, 840 A.2d 641 (Del. 2003); In re Unocal Exploration
Corp. S’holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 350 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding updated fairness
opinion not legally required since investment bank still believed transaction to be
fair); Behrens v. United Investors Mgmt. Co., 1993 WL 400209, at *11-12 (Del. Ch.
1993) (stating that intervening changes may require board to inquire whether
fairness opinion has been adversely affected).
22. See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at 654-56 (discussing the fairness opinion
preparation and board delivery process).
23. For recent examples of fairness opinions, see Maytag Corp., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Form 14A), at Annex B (Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Maytag Proxy
Statement] (containing the fairness opinion of Lazard Frères & Co., LLC delivered
to the Maytag board in connection with Maytag’s proposed acquisition by Whirlpool
Corporation for cash and securities); PeopleSoft, Inc., Amendment to
Recommendation Statement (Form 14D9/A), at Exs. (a)(143) & (a)(144) (Dec. 15,
2004) (containing the fairness opinions of Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. and
Goldman, Sachs & Co. delivered to the PeopleSoft board in connection with
PeopleSoft’s acquisition by Oracle Corporation for cash); Plains Resources, Inc.,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at App. B (June 23, 2004) [hereinafter
Plains Resources Proxy Statement] (containing the fairness opinion of Petrie
Parkman & Co., Inc. delivered to the special committee of the Plains Resources
board in connection with the corporation’s going-private).
24. See supra note 23 for examples of fairness opinions which contain this
restrictive language and infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of these qualifications and limitations; see also Kennedy, supra note 9, at
611-13 (discussing customary fairness opinion language).
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the fairness of the transaction at-hand is opined to. In a corporate
26
control transaction, this is a statement that the consideration paid or
received in the transaction is “fair from a financial point of view” to a
27
specified party. The party is dependent upon the form and posture
of the transaction, but the opinion is typically directed to the party
receiving or paying the transaction consideration. For example, in an
opinion delivered to an acquiree board considering the transfer of
corporate control through a corporate sale, the opinion would be to
28
the corporation’s selling stockholders.
A fairness opinion is not an appraisal. It does not specify a set
29
value or presume to be a determination of price. What a fairness
opinion is, is the opinion of a financial or other advisor that a
specified transaction is within a range of values encompassing
30
financial fairness. A more specific definition of fairness in these
25. See, e.g., Plains Resources Proxy Statement, supra note 23, at B-3.
26. If the transaction is structured as a stock-for-stock merger or exchange offer,
wherein the consideration paid by the acquirer consists of securities to be exchanged
for acquiree stock, the consideration for purposes of the opinion as to fairness would
be the stock exchange ratio. E.g., AT&T, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at
Annex B (May 23, 2005) [hereinafter AT&T Proxy Statement] (advising on the stockfor-stock merger of AT&T and a wholly-owned subsidiary of SBC Communications,
Credit Suisse First Boston LLC opined that “[a]s of the date hereof, the Exchange
Ratio [wa]s fair, from a financial point of view, to the holders of Company Common
Stock”).
27. The phrase “from a financial point of view” is not typically defined in the
written opinion but can be put forth for its plain meaning: financial fairness is
assessed based on a numerical range of value. Put another way, one practitioner
commentator has proposed “from a financial point of view” to mean “that the bank’s
opinion is based on numbers and manipulations and comparisons of these numbers.
No other non-number factors . . . are taken into account.” Kennedy, supra note 9, at
615-16. It has at times been proposed that the definition of fairness be expanded
beyond a financial assessment to encompass retention and compensation
arrangements entered into in connection with corporate control transactions. The
rationale is to limit officer and director rent-seeking through a fairness check to
ensure that these arrangements are not exigent. These proposals should be rejected.
Certainly, these and other arrangements and the real and potential problem of abuse
are a troublesome issue in corporate control transactions. This is not in doubt.
However, addressing these issues through the fairness opinion regime misses the
point of a fairness opinion and, at best, conflates the solution to the problem. A
fairness opinion speaks only to a price. It can be defined as an opinion that a price is
within a range of acceptable values. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text
(discussing the limitations of a fairness opinion with respect to ascertainment of
price). Stockholders should evaluate the consideration paid and retention and other
compensation arrangements separately. Fairness opinions should opine only to
financial fairness.
28. For these purposes, the opinion would be only to those stockholders who are
unaffiliated with the acquirer. For example, in one recent going-private transaction,
the opinion stated that the consideration was fair, from a financial point of view, to
the public stockholders other than the members of management who were
stockholders and participants in the transaction and their affiliates. See Plains
Resources Proxy Statement, supra note 23, at App. B, B-3.
29. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 612.
30. Id. at 613; see also Yasuhiro Ohta & Kenton K. Yee, The Fairness Opinion
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circumstances is almost never proposed or spelled out. In fact, the
definition of fairness varies in context and, in each instance, is subject
32
In a corporate
to debate among practitioners and academics.
control transaction, one definition of fairness, from an acquiree’s
perspective, is a minimum range of values that the corporation’s
unaffiliated stockholders would otherwise receive in a board-run
33
auction process conducted in a fair, open, and equivalent manner.
However, the definition of fairness runs depending upon the opinee,
34
as well as the transaction and its unique characteristics. To date,
there is no agreed-upon standard definition among academics,

Puzzle: Board Incentives, Information Asymmetry, and Bidding Strategy (May 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that acquiree fairness
opinion ranges are a product of game theory—more specifically, a “cheap talk” game
between the board and existing stockholders as well as future stockholders, designed
to simultaneously convince current stockholders to support the transaction while
talking up the price to future stockholders if the transaction fails).
31. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 30 (“[I]nvestment banks generally do
not disclose which definition of fair price they have used; their fairness opinions
simply state that prices are ‘fair from a financial point of view.’”). In the eighties and
early nineties, fairness opinions sometimes stated that a transaction was also
equitable or otherwise briefly defined fairness. E.g., In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.,
Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. 1993) (fairness opinion stated that “the financial
terms of the [transaction] are fair and equitable”). However, due to liability
concerns, today it is extremely rare for an investment bank to go beyond a simple
opinion that a proposed transaction is “fair” or “inadequate.” See infra note 36
(discussing the scope of liability for statements of opinion under the federal
securities laws). However, fairness opinions in non-U.S. transactions still sometimes
do go farther where it may be a requirement or practice of the local jurisdiction.
E.g., Sinopec Beijing Yanhua Petrochemical Co. Ltd, Transaction Statement (Form
13e-3), at D-15 (Jan. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Sinopec Form 13e-3] (fairness opinion
stated that the terms of the transaction were “fair and reasonable”).
32. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 30-34 (noting lack of agreement
on the appropriate fairness standard); Leonard Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point
of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is ‘Third Party Sale Value’ the Appropriate
Standard?, 36 BUS. LAW. 1439 (1981); Kennedy, supra note 9, at 616-17 (discussing the
definition of fairness).
33. There are, however, other definitions. Fairness here could alternatively be
formulated as one of the following: the price that otherwise would be arrived at
through independent bargaining between the acquiree and the acquirer; the
acquiree’s liquidation value; the value of the acquiree absent any control premium,
transaction cost-savings, synergies, or other transaction-related value; or the value of
the sum of the acquiree’s businesses. See generally Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10,
at 30-34 (outlining various possible definitions of fairness in a corporate control
transaction). One commentator has rejected all of these definitions; he defines
fairness as simply the price that any selling stockholder is willing to accept. Elson, Are
They Fair, supra note 10, at 953. However, I would suggest that an appropriate
definition of acquiree fairness in any context, absent unusual circumstances, is the
price that otherwise would be set in an effective market, and I would put forth an
auction-based process as the optimal mechanism for achieving such price in a
corporate control transaction.
34. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 32 (noting that context can influence
the definition of fairness).
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practitioners, or standard-setters of what fairness is in any
35
circumstance. This is startling.
Liability concerns have driven fairness opinion structure and form.
Investment banks have eschewed definitional fairness, since
elaboration provides further facts and conclusions upon which to
challenge the validity or preparation of an opinion or to otherwise
assert under the federal securities and other disclosure-based laws
36
that it is a statement of fact rather than opinion. The qualification
and assumptions are crafted responses designed in part to restrict or
obviate court attempts to broaden the measure of review incumbent
37
upon investment banks in the preparation of fairness opinions, as
35. Cf. Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment Bankers to Shareholders, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 497, 517 (1992) (“The profusion of differing concepts of value may cause both
director and banker error.”).
36. An opinion will be deemed untrue for purposes of the federal securities laws
if it is “issued without a genuine belief or reasonable basis.” Herskowitz v.
Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Eisenberg v. Gagnon,
766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d
1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977) (“An opinion or prediction is actionable if there is a gross
disparity between prediction and fact.”); In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Secs. Litig., 126
F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that “material statements of
opinion are false only if the opinion was not sincerely held” and “[i]n the case of a
fairness opinion, then, the plaintiff must plead with particularity why the statement
of opinion was objectively and subjectively false”). While Herskowitz and McKesson
established that liability could be had for an untrue fairness opinion, as a practical
matter, it is difficult to prove that a subjective opinion is untrue for purposes of the
federal securities law. See Herskowitz, 857 F.2d at 185; McKesson, 126 F. Supp. 2d at
1265.
37.
A fairness opinion, for example, will typically state that
we have not assumed any responsibility for independent verification of any
of the foregoing information and have relied on its being complete and
accurate . . . [w]e have not been requested to make, and have not made, an
independent evaluation or appraisal of the assets or liabilities . . . of the
[acquiree] or [acquirer], nor have we been furnished with any such
evaluations or appraisals.
AT&T Proxy Statement, supra note 26, at B-1, B-2. Absent unusual circumstances or
contradictory information, an investment bank may rely exclusively upon and
assume, without independent verification or investigation, the accuracy of any
information provided to it for purposes of its fairness opinion. See MARTIN LIPTON &
ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS § 8.06.5 (2005) (citing cases
finding a duty to investigate where the investment bank had some basis to believe
that the information provided was inaccurate or misleading). In addition, in a
public corporate control transaction, a corporation can put limitations upon the
information provided to the investment bank so long as this stricture is disclosed to
stockholders. See Dowling v. Narangasset Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1119
(D.R.I. 1990) (holding board limitation on the scope of information utilized by
investment bank was required to be disclosed in proxy statement); Joseph v. Shell Oil
Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341-42 (Del. Ch. 1984) (holding corporation failed to “clearly and
unequivocally” disclose that essential and necessary information had been withheld
from the provider of a fairness opinion). For a thorough discussion of other routine
limitations and qualifications placed by investment banks in fairness opinions, see
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 223-25; Dennis J. Block & Jonathon M. Hoff, Reliance on
Fairness Opinions, N.Y.L.J., June 16, 1994, at 5.
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well as the scope of an investment bank’s duty to the relevant
38
Even the addressee, the board, is a
corporation’s stockholders.
creature of liability concern. The board, rather than stockholders, is
the addressee in order to refute stockholder claims of reliance upon
39
the opinion. Ultimately, while a full review of the fairness opinion
form is beyond the scope of this Article, it can be claimed that these
caveats and omissions eat up much of the worth of any fairness
opinion.
These failings are exacerbated by the customary
indemnification arrangements and measured release from liability
that investment banks demand and regularly receive in connection
40
with their provision of a fairness opinion.
However, criticizing the obvious limitations of the fairness opinion
form may be tendentiously unfair to investment bankers. A fairness
opinion delivered orally or in writing by the preparer at a board
meeting is almost always, at least in a corporate control transaction,
41
accompanied by a “board book.”
The board book details the
38. A typical acquiree-side fairness opinion in a corporate control transaction will
state that the opinion therein is only provided to the board in connection with the
board’s consideration of the transaction at hand and “does not constitute a
recommendation to any stockholder as to how such stockholder should vote or act
on any matter” relating to the transaction. AT&T Proxy Statement, supra note 26, at
B-2. This statement is placed solely to restrict the investment bank’s potential
liability to stockholders, and it is of doubtful effect since, in a public corporate
control transaction, the opinion is required to be publicly disclosed and will be
reviewed and possibly relied upon by the corporation’s stockholders. See infra Part
III.A (discussing fairness opinion disclosure requirements under the federal
securities law). Nonetheless, with or without these disclaimers, the exact scope of an
investment bank’s liability to stockholders for the rendering of an “incorrect”
fairness opinion is still uncertain and subject to much judicial and academic debate.
For further discussion of this point and the potential scope of investment bank
liability with respect to fairness opinions, see Fiflis, supra note 35; Giuffra, supra note
10; M. Breen Haire, The Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment Bankers in Change-ofControl Transactions: In re Daisy Systems Corp., 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1999); Martin,
supra note 10; Tariq Mundiya, Liability of Investment Banks: An Update on Recent
Developments, 11 INSIGHTS 15 (Oct. 1997); Dale A. Oesterle, Fairness Opinions as Magic
Pieces of Paper, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 541 (1992); John S. Rubenstein, Note, Merger &
Acquisition Fairness Opinions:
A Critical Look at Judicial Extensions of Liability to
Investment Banks, 93 GEO. L.J. 1723, 1729-41 (2005); Shaw & Gac, supra note 1;
Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, A Theoretic Analysis of Corporate Auctioneers’
Liability Regimes, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1147, 1158-71 (1992); Donald Lund, Comment,
Toward a Standard for Third-Party Advisor Liability in Mergers and Buy-Outs: Schneider
and Beyond, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 603, 611-21 (1991).
39. It is therefore a strange dichotomy that a fairness opinion can opine that the
consideration is fair to the corporation’s stockholders but is addressed and delivered
to the board.
40. This limitation of liability usually releases an investment bank from all but its
own willful misconduct or gross negligence. For an example of an investment bank
engagement letter containing such provisions, see John F. Seegal, Negotiating the
Investment Banking Engagement Letter, in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD
COMPANY, at 173 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 61494,
June-July, 2005).
41. See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at n.29 (asserting the importance of
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underlying analyses conducted by the opiner to arrive at and
42
It is here that the meat of the
conclude financial fairness.
43
investment banker’s work lies. A well-advised board will review this
book in connection with their receipt of a fairness opinion and
44
question the bankers as to their derivation of fairness. It is in these
actual analyses that the meaning and worth, if any, of a fairness
45
opinion lies.
B. The Fairness Opinion—Delaware’s Pivotal Role
The primacy and role of the fairness opinion stems from the
vicissitudes of Delaware corporate law. This is a fairly recent
development. Prior to 1985, the role and necessity of the fairness
46
opinion in a corporate control transaction was a legal uncertainty.
47
These opinions existed solely as an investment banking product.
This is not to say that legal practitioners perceived these opinions as
valueless in aid of board decision-making and satisfaction of a board’s
fiduciary duties. They did see such utility and routinely advised their
48
obtainment. However, the need for a fairness opinion was not, at
this time, recognized by the Delaware courts as an integral, or indeed
carefully reviewing the banker’s financial analyses set forth in a board book).
42. For examples of a board book, see Chiron Corp., Transaction Statement
(Form 13e-3), at Ex. C3 (Nov. 11, 2005); Sungard Data Systems, Inc., Transaction
Statement (Form 13e-3), at Ex. C7 (Apr. 12, 2005).
43. See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at 653-54 (observing that the bulk of the
investment banker’s involvement is in the information-gathering and analysis stage,
rather than in the actual delivery of the opinion).
44. Van Gorkom arguably set a legal requirement for this review under Delaware
law by finding a board to have breached its duty of care in part due to the board’s
failure to inquire and scrutinize the valuation information presented to it. Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877 (Del. 1985). This obligation was affirmed in Hanson
Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., when the Second Circuit applying Delaware
law found a board to have breached its fiduciary duties by ‘baldly’ relying on a
fairness opinion. 781 F.2d 264, 289 (2d Cir. 1986). The court held that a board has
“some oversight obligations to become reasonably familiar with an opinion, report,
or other source of advice before becoming entitled to rely on it.” Id. at 275.
However, subsequent Delaware courts have tended to assign less significance to such
a review; permitting boards to prima facie rely on fairness opinions and financial
valuations without significant or, in some instances any, inquiry. See infra notes 219226 and accompanying text (discussing the post-Van Gorkom treatment of fairness
opinions by the Delaware courts).
45. See infra notes 229-233 and accompanying text for further discussion by the
Delaware Court of Chancery of this distinction.
46. See supra Introduction.
47. See generally Feinstein, Valuation and Fairness Opinions, 32 BUS. LAW. 1337
(1977).
48. One empirical study found that from 1980-1985, acquirees obtained fairness
opinions in fifty-seven percent of public corporate control transactions (defined for
such purposes as a merger, tender offer, exchange offer or leveraged buy-out).
However, by 1985, only nineteen percent of acquirees obtained a fairness opinion in
such transactions. Bowers, supra note 12, at 573-74.
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any, part of the corporate control transaction process, and, prior to
1985, fairness opinions were rarely mentioned in Delaware
49
jurisprudence.
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its opinion in Van
50
Gorkom.
The Court found the board of the Trans Union
Corporation to have breached its duty of care by approving the
acquisition of the corporation in a cash-out merger in a manner that
51
was not the product of an informed business judgement. A full
discussion and criticism of the facts and ruling of Van Gorkom could
52
be, and has been, the topic of full academic study. However, for this
Article it is sufficient to state that one of the principal bases for the
Court’s holding was the failure of the board in its decision-making
process to obtain or consider a well-prepared financial analysis as to
53
the intrinsic worth of Trans Union. The Court stated:
Several defendants testified that [they were legally advised] that
Delaware law did not require a fairness opinion or an outside
valuation of the Company before the Board could act on the
Pritzker proposal. If given, the advice was correct. However, that
did not end the matter. Unless the directors had before them
adequate information regarding the intrinsic value of the
Company, upon which a proper exercise of business judgment
54
could be made, mere advice of this type is meaningless . . . .

The Court held that the board’s failure to obtain anything more
than a rough and unquestioned estimate of possible value from the
corporation’s chief financial officer did not satisfy this explicated
55
56
duty.
More was required.
However, it was obvious from any
reading of the opinion, and reflected in the quote above, that a
fairness opinion was not necessarily this requirement. Rather, an
acquiree board, as part of its greater duty of care in a corporate
control transaction, was now obligated to duly inform itself as to its
57
corporation’s sale value through a well-prepared financial analysis.
49. A Westlaw search in the Delaware state law case database resulted in only
thirteen opinions issued prior to Van Gorkom which referenced a fairness opinion.
The first mention of a fairness opinion in the case database is in the year 1977.
50. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
51. Id. at 888.
52. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 9; Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom:
The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 BUS. LAW. 1187 (1986); Symposium, Van
Gorkom and the Corporate Board: Problem, Solution, or Placebo, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449
(2002); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, Trans Union
Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127 (1988).
53. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 881.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 877-78.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 876.
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The fairness opinion would become institutionalized due to other
entwinements of Delaware law.
The transforming actor was Delaware statute title 8, section 141(e)
of the Delaware Code. This provision of the Delaware General
Corporation Law provides that directors are “fully protected in
relying in good faith . . . upon such information, opinions, reports or
statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation’s
officers or employees . . . or by any other person as to matters the
member reasonably believes are within such other person’s
58
professional or expert competence.” The directors in Van Gorkom
had claimed reliance on this statute based upon the advice of the
59
corporation’s chief executive and chief financial officers. The Court
rejected this defense in those circumstances but did strongly imply
that the obtainment of a thoroughly prepared valuation study or a
fairness opinion would satisfy not only the board’s duty of care to be
duly informed as to corporate value, but would establish sufficient
60
basis to rely on section 141(e).
Later, Delaware court opinions
would provide further buttressed support for this inference,
61
particularly with respect to fairness opinions.
Interestingly, on this basis, academics and practitioners put forth
the fairness opinion and not the financial analysis itself as a means for
a board to advantage itself among the cross-currents of section 141(e)
62
and Van Gorkom’s holding.
However, it is clear that an outside
valuation akin to the board book analysis should suffice thereunder—
a natural conclusion since the fairness opinion is derivative of the
63
underlying valuation. There is nothing in the literature or that has
otherwise been put forth to support this distinction. It appears to
have just happened, and post-Van Gorkom, the use of fairness opinions
64
by acquirees in corporate control transactions became routine. As
58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001).
59. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.
60. Id. at 876-77 (citing tit. 8, § 141(e) and stating that “under appropriate
circumstances, such directors may be fully protected in relying in good faith upon
the valuation reports of their management”).
61. See infra notes 219-226 and accompanying text (discussing post-Van Gorkom
reliance on and endorsement of fairness opinions by Delaware courts).
62. See supra note 9 (discussing academic conclusions that, post-Van Gorkom,
fairness opinions became a mandatory legal obligation).
63. See generally supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
64. According to one empirical study, in the period 1986-1989 following Van
Gorkom, fairness opinions were obtained by acquirees in fifty-five percent of public
corporation control transactions (defined for such purposes as a merger, tender
offer, exchange offer or leveraged buy-out). In 1986, fairness opinions were
obtained by forty-two percent of acquirees in such transactions as opposed to only
nineteen of acquirees in 1985, the year of Van Gorkom. Bowers, supra note 12, at 57475.
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to why the fairness opinion was outsourced to investment banks and
other financial advisors rather than internal corporate officer
analysis, the reasons are straight-forward. First, the delivery of this
financial information through an investment bank shifts potential
liability from internal corporate actors to outside, more liabilityremote parties. Second, if the recipient is the acquiree in a corporate
control transaction it avoids systemic management conflict, since
officers oftentimes benefit substantially from a corporate control
65
transaction in disproportion to unaffiliated stockholders.
Finally, in Van Gorkom, the court treated the need for a wellprepared financial analysis of value in a corporate control transaction
as a creature independent of the process utilized to arrive at an
66
offered price. That is, the court treated the need for this analysis as
an island divorced from other considerations and actions in a
corporate control transaction. The court did pay credence, but did
not accept, commonly held finance principles as to value being the
67
price in the efficient market and the post-agreement market check
or auction process as an alternative to achieving fair value
65. This benefit most commonly takes the form of “golden parachutes,”
accelerated option vesting, and other compensation mechanisms which award
executives upon a change in control of the corporation.
However, the
disproportionate gain can also take the form of employment or consulting
arrangements, non-competition agreements, or other future benefits provided by the
acquirer to the acquiree’s management. See also LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note
37, § 10.09 (discussing executive compensation in merger and acquisition
transactions and the tax treatment thereof); Richard P. Bress, Note, Golden
Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 955-63 (1987) (detailing use
and structure of golden parachutes). See generally Barbara B. Creed & Jay David
Gayner, Terms of Employment: A Review of Employment Practices Related to Changes in
Corporate Control, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1987: PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND
STRATEGIES (PLI Corp. Tax Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 254,
1987) (discussing various types of executive compensation in the corporate change
of control context).
66. The court did this by establishing a per se requirement for a financial analysis
in a corporate control transaction. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.
67. A market check is a mechanism whereby a corporation will agree to be
acquired without conducting an auction or soliciting all potential acquirers. The
post-agreement price will then be “checked” via the market. More specifically, if a
second, higher offer does emerge after announcement of the agreement, the
acquiree retains the ability to terminate the initial agreement and enter into a new
acquisition agreement with the second, higher bidder. Under Delaware corporate
law, a market check is a permitted acquisition mechanism. Additionally, in
connection with its agreement to a market check, an acquiree may agree to deal
protection devices that inhibit but do not prevent a second, higher bid and that
require payment of a break-up fee to the initial acquirer if their agreement is
terminated due to a second bid. See, e.g., In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig.,
787 A.2d 691, 705-06 (Del. Ch. 2001); Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC
Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 292-93 (Del. Ch. 1998); In re Fort Howard Corp.
Shareholders Litigation, 1988 WL 83147, at *13 (Del. Ch. 1988). See generally Charles
F. Richards, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Return of the Market Check, 15 No. 6 INSIGHTS 20,
20 (2001) (outlining the contours of a Delaware post-agreement market check).
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independent of a valuation or fairness opinion delivered to a board.
However, this does not comport with finance beliefs then or now.
Assuming financial analysis actually can inform as to value, the
minimum value range that a similarly informed financial analysis
should arrive at should roughly equate with the unaffected, minimum
price achievable in a properly run market-based process such as an
auction. If such process is actually utilized, a financial analysis or
69
fairness opinion to confirm the “fairness” of a price is superfluous.
The Delaware courts’ response to (or more appropriately conscious
ignorance of) this dichotomy is discussed further infra at Part III.C.
II. REVIEW OF THE FAIRNESS OPINION
This Part explores the limitations of the fairness opinion. More
specifically, it could be posited that the Delaware Supreme Court’s
endorsement of a required acquiree financial analysis in Van Gorkom
was a flawed one because it rested on quicksand assumptions about
the inherent accuracy and comparability of the valuation practices
undergirding fairness opinions. These deficits were compounded by
a process-based defect: the inherent conflicts in investment banking
fairness opinion practices post-Van Gorkom. By stress-testing the
fairness opinion with the weight of these arguments, this Part
attempts to outline the true parameters of the fairness opinion’s
utility.
A. The Valuation Problem
1. Subjectivity
A fairness opinion’s worth ultimately lies in the reliability and
70
accuracy of its underlying valuation analyses. This is the realm of
finance—and academics have made significant strides in the previous
decades to develop techniques by which a theoretically reliable range

68. The defendants argued in Van Gorkom that any breach of their duty of care
had been cured by the post-agreement market check conducted by Trans Union.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 878. The court dismissed this argument on the basis that the
agreements and time limitations agreed to by the Trans Union board did not truly
permit a meaningful market test. Id. at 880, 885. The court did not address whether
a proper market check would have cured the found breach. In comparison, the
dissenting opinion in Van Gorkom cited the market test conducted by Trans Union
approvingly as “buttressing” an informed business judgment. Id. at 897 (McNeilly, J.,
dissenting).
69. I flesh out this argument infra notes 305-308 and accompanying text.
70. See generally Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of Modern Finance Theory in
Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2003) (surveying several financial theories
and methodologies used in valuation analyses and the comparative utility of each).
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71

of values can be achieved. However, there is still an element of
72
subjectivity present in the choice and application of these methods.
The end-result is to provide the preparer discretion to effect the
outcome of a valuation and a diminished ability for outsiders to make
comparative assessments of analyses.
There are a number of different underlying valuation analyses
upon which a fairness opinion can rest. The most common and
73
accepted techniques are discounted cash flow,
comparable
74
75
76
77
companies, premium, break-up, and liquidation analysis. The
71. See supra note 14 (citing historical discussions of these developments).
72. See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of these issues.
73. A discounted cash flow analysis calculates the present value of the future free
cash flows of the corporation by discounting the cash flows at a specific discount rate.
In practice, a discounted cash flow of a corporate entity consists of three principal
components. First, an estimate is made of the future free cash flows of the
corporation over a set period of time, typically three to ten years but variant
depending upon available projections. Second, a value of the corporation’s free cash
flows in perpetuity after this discrete period is forecasted. This second value is
known as a terminal value, and it is typically calculated by applying a perpetual
growth rate to the estimated cash flow in the first year of this period. Finally, the
cash flows derived in the first two steps are discounted back at an appropriate
discount rate to arrive at a present value of all of the future cash flows of the
corporation. See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 75-80, 551 (outlining the
methodology for conduct of a discounted cash flow analysis of a business); MARK
GRINBLATT & SHERIDAN TITMAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 299-324
(2d ed. 2002) (outlining the methodology for conduct of a discounted cash flow
analysis of real assets); PRATT ET AL., supra note 14, at 155-62 (outlining the
methodology for conduct of a discounted cash flow analysis of a business).
74. A comparable companies analysis compares the corporation being valued
against selected similarly situated, publicly traded companies. These companies are
compared using price multiples of each corporation’s stock against selected
benchmarks, such as price to future earnings, price to forecasted sales, or price to
book. A well-performed comparable companies analysis will adjust the capital
structures of each comparable company in order to more accurately compare them
with the corporation being valued. See generally ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT
VALUATION, at 453-56 (2002) (discussing various methods of comparable company
valuation); KRISHNA G. PALEPU ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS ANALYSIS &
VALUATION 7-16 - 7-23 (1997) (noting the complexities and difficulties that arise in
comparable companies valuation).
75. A premium analysis compares the premium being paid in the corporate
control transaction against historical premiums paid, for selected, similarly-situated
companies.
Typically, a premium analysis is conducted side-by-side with a
comparable companies analysis often utilizing the same corporate entities. See
generally DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 712 (discussing parallel use of these
techniques in change of control transactions).
76. A break-up analysis, sometimes called a sum-of-parts analysis, assumes that the
different businesses of the corporation will be parceled out separately and sold. It
then values each of these units on a stand-alone basis to derive a value for the entire
corporate entity. See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at 650 (discussing the
application of a break-up analysis in the fairness opinion context).
77. A liquidation analysis assumes that the assets of the corporation will be sold
separately in an orderly liquidation of the firm. It then values the assets of the
corporation on this basis. It is different than a break-up analysis in that it assumes
that each business entity can be liquidated and sold as other than a going-concern,
whereas a break-up analysis assumes that each business will be sold intact. See
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preparer of a fairness opinion will typically utilize a weighted
78
combination of these to arrive at a fairness conclusion. The choice
of a particular analysis to employ and the weight given to each is
partially subjective and depends upon the asset being valued and the
79
relevant circumstances.
For example, in the corporate control
transaction paradigm the most important analysis is, absent unusual
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 640-42 (discussing application of a liquidation analysis in
the fairness opinion context).
78. See, e.g., Maytag Proxy Statement, supra note 23, at 59-63 (fairness opinion
prepared by Lazard Freres & Co., LLC based in part on discounted cash flow,
comparable company, and premiums paid analyses); Toys “R” Us, Inc., Definitive
Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 24-30 (May 23, 2005) (fairness opinion
prepared by Credit Suisse First Boston LLC based in part on discounted cash flow,
comparable company, premiums paid, and break-up analyses); Cysive, Inc.,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 38-46 (Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter
Cysive Proxy Statement] (fairness opinion prepared by Broadview International, LLC
based in part on comparable company, premiums paid, and liquidation analyses).
79. For example, a discounted cash flow analysis generally requires that the
stream of future free cash flows be steady and ascertainable. See, e.g., Cysive Proxy
Statement, supra note 78, at 45 (disclosing that fairness opinion did not rely upon a
discounted cash flow analysis since the corporation’s “business model has never been
cash flow positive and management was uncertain in estimating . . . the future cash
flows”). Thus, for a recently-formed corporation or one that is in a state of flux with
no reliable, forecasted free cash flows, a discounted cash flow analysis is
inappropriate. See, e.g., Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *7
(Del. Ch. 2004) (using comparable company analysis to value corporation for
purposes of an appraisal proceeding and stating that a discounted cash flow analysis
for these purposes would be of marginal utility “in the absence of reasonably reliable
contemporaneous projections [and] the degree of speculation and uncertainty
characterizing the future prospects of [the corporation]”).
Meanwhile, a
comparable companies analysis can only be conducted when there exists comparable
publicly traded companies. This is sometimes not the case. See, e.g., In re Radiology
Assoc., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991) (asserting that differences
between proposed comparable companies were so large that any comparable
companies comparison was meaningless). Similarly, a break-up analysis is only
appropriate when the corporation consists of a discrete set of separately identifiable
businesses. See generally Dean LeBaron & Lawrence S. Speidell, Why Are the Parts
Worth More than the Sum? “Chop Shop,” A Corporate Valuation Model, in THE MERGER
BOOM 78 (Lynn E. Browne & Eric S. Rosengren eds., 1987). Finally, a liquidation
analysis is typically employed when the viability of the corporation as a going-concern
is at issue or otherwise when the corporation consists primarily of real assets, such as
oil deposits, since liquidation analysis fails to capture good-will and other inherent
value in the corporation as a going-concern. See, e.g., In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders
Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 538 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that directors of the corporation
preferred sale of corporation rather than liquidation, “as such a transaction could
result in a recognition of the value [of the corporation], whereas a liquidation was
unlikely to yield as high a price”); In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 1990 WL 201390,
at *16-*17 (Del. Ch. 1990) (noting use of liquidation analysis to value oil corporation
for fairness opinion, but stating that the investment bank did not primarily rely upon
this analysis as it considered such a liquidation unlikely). See generally DAMODARAN,
supra note 74, at 946-50 (describing available business valuation models and the
appropriate use of each to arrive at a reasonable value determination); ASWATH
DAMODARAN, THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION (2001) (examining the use and limits of
valuation techniques in the context of valuing high technology and new economy
firms); Kennedy, supra note 9, at 617-44 (explaining various recurring valuation
techniques and the appropriate use of each in the fairness opinion context).
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80

circumstances, the discounted cash flow calculus. However, in the
investment banking community, there are no uniform, specific, and
objective guidelines as to the exact mix and weight to assign to each
of these methods to arrive at fairness.
Each of the techniques in and of themselves is also prone to
subjectivity.
For example, a discounted cash flow analysis is
conducted by discounting back at a chosen discount rate the
81
projected future free cash flows and terminal value of an asset. In
performing this analysis there are three central choices, which must
be made, each of which can significantly affect the final valuation.
82
These are the correct forecasted free cash flows to utilize, the
83
84
appropriate discount rate, and the terminal value of the asset.
80. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 75-80; DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 11.
This preference extends to the Delaware courts. See, e.g., Andaloro v. PFPC
Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The [discounted cash
flow] method is frequently used in this court and, I, like many others, prefer to give it
great, and sometimes even exclusive, weight when it may be used responsibly.”);
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084, at *7 (Del. Ch. 1990) (claiming
the discounted cash flow analysis “is in theory the single best technique to estimate
the value of an economic asset”).
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (elaborating on the parameters of a
discounted cash flow analysis and the definition of terminal value).
82. These are generally available forecasts previously prepared by management
of the corporation. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 551. Cf. Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *7 (Del. Ch. 2003) (asserting that
management projections are particularly useful in the appraisal context because they
are by definition not tainted by transaction pressures and hindsight), aff’d in relevant
part, 875 A.2d 602 (Del. 2005). However, sometimes such forecasts do not exist or
are otherwise unreliable. In such circumstances, free cash flow numbers must be
created out of whole cloth with consequent heightened subjectivity, uncertainty, and
manipulability.
83. The accepted industry method for computation of a discount rate is to
compute the corporation’s weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”), otherwise
known as the corporation’s opportunity cost of capital for its assets. WACC is
typically computed in accordance with the following formula:
rdebt(1Tc)(D/V)+requity(E/V) where rdebt = rate of return on the corporation’s debt; requity =
rate of return on the corporation’s equity; D = value of the corporation’s debt; E =
value of the corporation’s equity; V = D+E; and Tc = the corporation’s marginal tax
rate. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 230-31. The computation of WACC requires
ascertainment of the rate of return on the corporation’s equity or requity. A
corporation’s return on equity can also be phrased as the risk premium of the
corporation’s stock over and above the market risk premium which itself is the
general return of the market over and above the risk free rate. There is debate and
disagreement over the appropriate methodology to estimate a corporation’s requity;
however, industry practice is to use the capital asset pricing model (“CAPM”). See
infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. The CAPM is calculated in accordance
with the following formula: Requity = Rfree+ (Rmarket-Rfree) where Rfree = risk free rate (e.g.,
rate on governmental bonds); (Beta) = covariance between the market’s return and
the individual corporation’s stock return; and Rmarket = return on the market. BREALEY
& MYERS, supra note 14, at 169-77, 194-97; see also DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 15459, 181-206 (setting forth example calculation methods for Rfree, Rmarket and Beta).
84. Terminal value typically comprises the majority of the future free cash flows
of the corporation. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 531.
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There is substantial leeway to determine each of these, and any
85
change can markedly affect the discounted cash flow value. For
example, a change in the discount rate by one percent on a stream of
cash flows in the billions of dollars can change the discounted cash
86
flow value by tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars. However,
again there is no standard-setting or other body guiding these or
other preparation decisions. Rather, a discounted cash flow analysis,
like other valuation analyses, is typically compiled using historically
developed and unguided industry practices as influenced and first
85. Future free cash flows, as with any forecast, are predictions of future
performance that may or may not be correct and are subject to the preparer’s best
judgement. It is no understatement to assert that there can be vast disagreement on
what constitutes the best estimates of future performance and the appropriate future
forecasted free cash flows of a corporation. See Kenton K. Yee, Combining Value
Estimates to Increase Accuracy, 60 FIN. ANAL. J. 23, 23 (July/August 2004) (stating that
“[b]ecause of uncertainty in prospective cash flows [discounted cash flow analysis]
inevitably leads to an imprecise answer”). The calculation of the discount rate using
the CAPM involves estimates of Rfree, Rmarket, and Beta. There is potential subjectivity
in each of these decisions. Rmarket has historically been thought to be seven to nine
percent but recent studies have argued that it is a lower figure, in the five to six
percent range. See ELROY DIMSON ET AL., TRIUMPH OF THE OPTIMISTS: 101 YEARS OF
GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS 165, 175, 211 (2002) (stating that over one hundred
and one years “the annualized (geometric mean) US equity risk premium relative to
bills was 5.8[%]” and that this is 1.5% lower than those of previous long-term studies
of the U.S. markets); see also DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 162 (noting that the
market risk premium can range from 4.5%-12.67% depending upon preparer
choice); PRATT ET AL., supra note 14, at 177 n.20 (identifying differences of opinion
as to methods of calculating equity risk premium). Rfree can vary depending upon
the country and the period referenced for determination of the rate. For example,
each of the one-year, ten-year, and thirty-year government bond rates differ, but it is
possible to rationally select any of them depending upon the circumstances.
DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 162-64; GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 73, at 155.
Finally, Beta, when calculated using regression, is subject to variance depending
upon the length of time and measure of the market returns utilized. Id. at 158. If
the corporation is not publicly traded, then estimating Beta becomes more difficult
and subject to increased uncertainty and discretion. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14,
at 234-38; DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 191-207. Terminal value is typically
calculated using a perpetuity: X/(r-g) where X = an estimate of the future free cash
flows in the first year of the perpetuity, r = WACC, and g = the perpetual growth rate.
Id. at 305. X is a forecast and subject to the same caveats made supra with respect to
forecasts. The subjectivity inherent in WACC calculations is also discussed supra.
Finally, there is no agreed upon standard perpetual growth rate, though it is typically
in the two to three percent range.
86. If the discount rate is ten percent on a stream of cash flows that is $100
million in each of years one through five, and thereafter has a terminal value of $1
billion (terminal value being calculated here using a zero percent perpetual growth
rate and a cash flow in year six of $100 million so that $1 billion = TV = $100
million/10%), the discounted cash flow value is $944 million. See generally supra
notes 73 & 85 (setting forth method of calculation of discounted cash flow and
terminal value, respectively). If the discount rate is lowered to nine percent, the
discounted cash flow value is now $1.051 billion. Thus, here a 1% change in the
discount rate results in an 11.4% difference in value. Cf. Metlyn Realty Corp. v.
Esmark, Inc., 763 F.2d 826, 835 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that “valuations are highly
sensitive to assumptions about the firm’s costs and rate of growth, and about the
discount rate”).
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put forth by academic practitioners. This lends itself to differences in
valuation approach in each application and among institutions as
87
each of them develops their own individual approach. This issue
arises not only with a discounted cash flow analysis, but with each of
88
the other valuation techniques.
This dazzling variability makes it difficult to rely, compare, or
analyze the valuations underlying a fairness opinion unless full
disclosure is made of the various inputs in the valuation process, the
weight assigned for each, and the rationale underlying these choices.
The substantial discretion and lack of guidelines and standards also
makes the process vulnerable to manipulation to arrive at the “right”
89
answer for fairness. This raises a further dilemma in light of the
conflicted nature of the investment banks who often provide these
opinions, an issue discussed infra at Part II.B.
2. Best practices
The issues with valuation practice today are not limited to a
problem of subjectivity. Industry valuation practice, as it is currently
conducted, also lags in many material respects and in circumstances
is even contradictory to modern finance theory. For example,
investment banks typically use the capital asset pricing model
90
(“CAPM”) to calculate the weighted average cost of capital
91
92
(“WACC”), or discount rate, for a discounted cash flow analysis.
However, current academic literature disputes the empirical validity
of this tool and instead has suggested alternatives to attain greater

87. See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 75-80 (observing the differing
results obtainable depending upon the choice of inputs for a discounted cash flow
analysis).
88. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing different approaches
for preparing comparable companies, premium, break-up, and liquidation analyses).
89. See generally Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for
Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 218 (1997)
(arguing that financial valuation is inescapably subjective and therefore, if viewed
with suspicion is “inherently manipulable”).
90. See supra note 83 (defining the CAPM).
91. See supra note 83 (defining WACC and discount rate).
92. See DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 219 (discussing recent study of industry
practices with respect to estimation of the cost of equity). Investment banks are not
the only entities who continue to use this model. A recent empirical survey of 392
firms found that seventy-four percent of them always, or almost always, utilize the
CAPM to value real assets. John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and
Practice of Corporate Finance: Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 197 (2001).
However, there is disparity here as well, and investment banks have been known to
use other methods to calculate WACC. See, e.g., Sungard Data Systems, Inc.,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 34-35 (June 27, 2005) [hereinafter
Sungard Proxy Statement] (disclosing investment bank calculated discount rate for
fairness opinion analysis by referencing WACC of comparable companies).
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93

accuracy. Furthermore, academic research concerning market risk
premiums has found the seven to nine percent rate historically
utilized for purposes of the CAPM to be overstated and actually in the
five to six percent range—this too has only been partly translated into
94
industry practice. The consequent result is that fairness opinions
today are frequently premised upon uncertain valuation
95
methodology.
The most likely reason for this failure to follow best practices is the
absence of a direct conduit between academics and practitioners for
the transmission of theories, developments, and research. Rather,
these are currently communicated through osmosis as practitioners
interact with academics and employ graduated students taught these
new methods. Investment banks also have limited incentive to
improve upon this inefficient method of knowledge transfer.
Corporations regularly purchase this product as prepared now (and if
an acquiree is essentially required to make such buy); as with any bad
96
habit, why change if there is no impetus to do so? The result is the
slow and haphazard adoption of new techniques and principles as
well as recognition of incorrect practices. More specifically, industry
valuations are regularly compiled based upon tenets that academics
97
no longer deem valid or otherwise dispute.
It is not only a matter of increased communication and earlier
absorption of research findings. Academics are in disagreement over
aspects central to valuation practice. For example, studies dispute
the appropriate methodology to calculate many of the various inputs
98
99
in the CAPM, a tool which, as noted, itself is also disputed. These
93. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 198-210 (outlining criticisms of the
CAPM and possible greater utility of multi-factor models); GRINBLATT & TITMAN,
supra note 73, at 158-68, 175-209 (describing empirical tests of the CAPM and multifactor models). See generally SHANNON P. PRATT, COST OF CAPITAL: ESTIMATION AND
APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 2002) (exploring the principles underlying estimation of the
CAPM and addressing commonly encountered variations in its application).
94. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 85, at 211-12.
95. See, e.g., Arthur H. Rosenbloom & Drew G.L. Chapman, Commentary, Fairness
Opinions—Can They be Made Useful?, 9 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 12 (2003)
(noting several examples of investment bank failure to follow best practices).
96. This is particularly true in today’s current regime where there are no
governing standards, an uncertain liability regime governing the provision of fairness
opinions, and, to the extent permitted by law, a blanket practice of corporations
indemnifying and releasing investment banks from liability for the provision of a
fairness opinion. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 12, at 575 (stating that cases on
investment bank liability for fairness opinions are “relatively small in number and too
divergent to establish a legal standard”); Fiflis, supra note 35 (discussing grounds for
investment bank liability for rendering defective fairness opinions).
97. See, e.g., Fiflis, supra note 35 (examining investment bank deficiencies in the
preparation of fairness opinions).
98. See supra note 85. See generally GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 73, at 155-58

DAVIDOFF_PRINTER

1580

8/12/2006 2:13:10 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1557

conflicts have led to a pick-and-choose approach among practitioners
with an obvious possible bias towards choosing the course indicative
100
of the desired outcome.
3. A telling example
Illustrative of the difficulties and issues delineated supra is a recent
Delaware Court of Chancery opinion issued by Vice Chancellor Strine
101
in Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc.
Andaloro was a consolidated
102
appraisal action arising out of the acquisition by PNC Financial
Services Group (“PNC”) of the two percent minority interest that it
did not own in its subsidiary, PFPC Worldwide, Inc. (“PFPC”) at a
103
price of $34.26 per share.
Vice Chancellor Strine’s appraisal
required him to make a judicial determination in accordance with
Delaware corporate law as to the fair value of the minority stake on
104
the date of acquisition.
The intricacies of appraisal proceedings
and the Delaware standard governing such matters have been the
105
subject of much study. It is fair to say that the statutory manner in
(surveying the various discretion and disagreement in determining the inputs for the
CAPM model).
99. See supra note 93.
100. See, e.g., Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that
financial valuation “calling for the court to derive a single best estimate of value
based on the ‘expert input’ of finance professionals paid to achieve diametrically
opposite objectives tends, regrettably, to surface minor, granular issues . . . . which
are not well addressed in the academic literature”).
101. Id.
102. Delaware law provides that in certain mergers, consolidations, and other
transactions a stockholder can “dissent” and seek appraisal by the Delaware Court of
Chancery of his or her stock. The stockholder is then entitled to payment of the
appraisal amount, together with interest, if any, by the surviving or resulting
corporation in the relevant transaction. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2001).
103. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *1. The Court of Chancery in Andaloro was
also confronted with a claim of equitable breach of fiduciary duty. Id. However, the
court only addressed the appraisal question in its opinion as its findings thereto were
dispositive of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Id. at *1, *22.
104. Under Delaware law, the Court of Chancery in an appraisal proceeding is
required to determine fair value by establishing the value of the entity as a going
concern. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2001). For these purposes, the value
arising from the transaction itself is excluded. Id. However, any minority discount is
also eliminated. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *8.
105. See, e.g., Peter V. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV.
1121 (1998) (critiquing the Delaware appraisal remedy under a preference
reconciliation theory); Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962) (arguing that the Delaware appraisal remedy
is legally disconnected from its’ traditionally justified purpose); Mary Siegel, Back to
the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79 (1995)
(recommending a more-tailored Delaware appraisal remedy); Randall S. Thomas,
Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (tracing the history of
the Delaware appraisal remedy and proposing revision); Robert B. Thompson, Exit,
Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1 (1995)
(arguing for a modernization of the Delaware appraisal remedy).
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which they are required to be conducted does not comport with
106
modern finance principles or theory. Nonetheless, to compute fair
value, Vice Chancellor Strine, inter alia, conducted a valuation of the
107
minority stake using a discounted cash flow analysis.
Vice Chancellor Strine was aided in this task by the petitioners’ and
108
Not
respondent’s experts who each prepared his own valuation.
surprisingly, there was a marked difference of opinion between the
two: the petitioners’ expert discounted cash flow analysis arrived at a
price of $60.76 per share while the respondent’s expert computed a
109
price of $21.35. Also not surprisingly, each purported to be based
on the right principles but was prepared using different
110
Nonetheless, Vice
methodologies, approaches, and numbers.
Chancellor Strine used these two valuations as a touchstone; he
traced each step in the valuation process and picked from one or the
other expert’s choice, and, in certain circumstances, he deviated
111
from both and made his own conclusions.
First, Vice Chancellor Strine settled on the appropriate forecasted
free cash flow numbers to conduct the discounted cash flow
112
calculation.
Here, the two expert parties were in material
agreement that available management projections were the best
113
This was fortuitous for valuation purposes, as
available figures.
disagreement about the underlying numbers would have led to even
114
more divergent expert results. Vice Chancellor Strine, accordingly,
106. See William T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 560 (2003) (commenting that the
Delaware courts have neglected increasing doubts about the CAPM’s perceived
“inability to explain significant aspects of market returns”); Campbell, supra note 70,
at 4 (claiming that courts “have, to a significant extent, failed to base their opinions
on modern finance theory”); William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the
Nonexistent: The Delaware Courts’ Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 845
(2003) (arguing that use of control premiums in appraisal proceedings is not
supported by modern corporate finance theory).
107. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *9-*16.
108. Id. at *2. The petitioners in the appraisal proceeding were the dissenting
minority stockholders of PFPC. The respondent in the proceeding was PFPC. The
parties were also plaintiffs and defendant, respectively, for purposes of the breach of
fiduciary duty claim. Id. at *1.
109. Id. at *10. Salomon Smith Barney had previously found a valuation range for
PFPC of $20.78 to $34.26 per share. This range removed any minority discount and
included a squeeze-out premium. Salomon Smith Barney rendered a fairness
opinion to PNC based on this valuation. Id. at *8.
110. See infra notes 113-142 and accompanying text.
111. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *9-*16. Vice Chancellor Strine stated that “at
the margins, [I have] resolved doubts in favor of the plaintiffs. In other words, the
valuation I set forth is more optimistic than is strictly justified.” Id. at *9.
112. Id. at *10-*11.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911, at *5-*8
(Del. Ch. 1995); see also supra note 86 (discussing the effect of a revision in the
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relied upon these management projections with only one slight
115
alteration recommended by the petitioners’ expert.
116
Second, Vice Chancellor Strine calculated PFPC’s terminal value
by adopting petitioners’ expert’s three-stage terminal value
117
approach.
In doing so, he rejected the two-stage model proposed
118
The three-stage approach divides up
by respondent’s expert.
terminal value into two different periods of higher than normal
119
growth. While theoretically this approach should arrive at the same
result as a two-stage analysis, which only uses one period for terminal
120
value, it more precisely illustrates actual corporate growth. For this
three-stage model, petitioners’ expert employed a second-stage, fouryear growth rate of 13.2% and a third-stage, terminal value perpetual
growth rate of five percent versus respondent’s steady terminal value
121
perpetual growth rate of five percent.
Vice Chancellor Strine
combined these approaches and chose a three-stage approach using a
three-year growth rate of eight percent followed by a perpetual
122
growth rate of five percent. In his opinion, Vice Chancellor Strine
rebutted petitioners’ initial choice of a higher rate but did not
explain the basis for his choice of eight percent and five percent,
other than a statement that he disagreed with petitioners’ expert, but
123
was more “bullish” than respondent’s expert. In fact, a five percent
perpetual growth rate is simply wrong as it assumes that PFPC would,

numbers utilized on a discounted cash flow valuation).
115. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *11.
116. See supra note 73 (defining terminal value and discussing its role in a
discounted cash flow calculation).
117. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *12-*13.
118. Id. at *12.
119. Id.
120. Id. A three-stage growth rate approach is more illustrative because a
corporation may have changing forecasted growth rates. If this is true, separating
terminal value into two different periods more accurately captures the different
projected future growth rates of the corporation over time. However, a two-stage
approach should theoretically arrive at the same result because the perpetual growth
rate would take into account this differential growth as an average over time.
121. Id. at *12-*13. Petitioner estimated post-2007 growth by “decreasing PFPC’s
growth in a linear way from the last year of the management projections in 2007,
which [he] calculated as a 20.3% increase in unlevered free cash flow, adjusting for
Retirement Services.” Id. The court did not put forth the rationale behind
petitioners’ expert’s choice of five percent for the tertiary stage of growth. Id.
Respondent’s expert posited that growth would slow after 2007 and therefore set a
growth rate of five percent by assuming that PFPC would grow at six percent for the
three years after 2007 and that a five percent figure thereafter was more in line with
national economic growth. Id. Whether any of these is right is anyone’s guess. See
generally DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 268-99 (outlining techniques to estimate
future growth for purposes of estimating future cash flows).
122. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *13.
123. Id.
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using historical rates, eventually outgrow the size of the U.S.
124
economy—an impossibility.
Third, Vice Chancellor Strine set the corporation’s going-forward
125
capital structure.
This is a required pre-step in the determination
126
Respondent’s expert targeted an allof a corporation’s WACC.
equity structure for PFPC based on comparative assessment of PFPC’s
competitors, while petitioners’ expert had assumed the continued
existence of PFPC’s $1.29 billion parent-subsidiary indebtedness for a
127
hybrid debt/equity structure.
Vice Chancellor Strine found
compelling respondent’s expert’s argument, and adopted an all128
equity model.
Accordingly, he discounted the value of the
129
He then discounted it back at the
corporation’s debt at maturity.
ultimate discount rate he determined for the cost of equity and
130
deducted this amount from the total value derived.
While the
opinion is unclear on this point, Vice Chancellor Strine’s decision to
discount the debt from maturity appears to unjustifiably reduce the
debt’s value due to its equity nature when discounting at the cost of
equity alone should be sufficient. The result appears to be a doublediscount of the debt. The petitioner’s position therefore appears
124. From 1929 to 2002, the average annual rate of growth of real United States
Gross Domestic Product was 3.4%. BUREAU OF ECON. STATISTICS, News Release:
National Income and Product Accounts Comprehensive Revision, Dec. 10, 2003, available at
http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrel/2003cr_newsrelease.htm. Thus, the five percent
(presumed real) number is well above the growth rate of the U.S. economy. See
DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 306 (“[The] growth rate cannot exceed the growth
rate of the economy in which a firm operates . . .”). Vice Chancellor Strine even
acknowledged that this was a high number. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *12 n.49.
Possibly, he chose this high growth rate because of the petitioners’ and respondent’s
experts’ unexplained agreement upon such figure, as well as his statement in the
opinion that he would err in his valuation on the side more favorable to the
petitioners. Id. Another explanation is that Vice Chancellor Strine used a nominal
rather than a real rate. However, all of this is conjecture.
125. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *13-*14.
126. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 532-36; see also supra note 83 (defining
WACC).
127. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *13. Petitioners’ expert likely favored the
maintenance of outstanding debt in this instance as the addition of debt results in
tax shields which lower WACC and increase the value of the corporation. BREALEY &
MYERS, supra note 14, at 533.
128. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *13. Vice Chancellor Strine adopted this
approach since the indebtedness was owed to PFPC’s parent and could not otherwise
have been incurred in the market. It was therefore akin to an equity investment and
should be treated as such. Id. at *13-*14.
129. Id. at *14.
130. Id. In contrast, respondent’s expert had “subtracted out the net debt of
PFPC, using the par value of the debt to PNC in that calculation, from its capital
structure.” Id. at *13. Vice Chancellor Strine adopted a different approach since
PNC did not have the right, as of the merger date, to demand full repayment of the
loan. Id. at *14. Accordingly, Vice Chancellor Strine argued that, “[g]iving some
weight to the contractual terms of the note, one can make the case for some discount
from par in the value of the debt to PNC.” Id.
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correct and is supported in the literature which recommends
petitioner’s approach when subtracting out debt for purposes of
calculating the cost of equity and WACC. 131
Finally, Vice Chancellor Strine used the CAPM to calculate the
132
return on equity for purposes of determining WACC.
Vice
Chancellor Strine utilized the same rates assigned by petitioners’ and
respondent’s experts for the risk free rate—4.7%, and market risk
133
premium—seven percent.
However, the seven percent figure, as
noted supra, is most likely a percentage point or two high. For the
134
required Beta figure the experts diverged in opinion as to method
135
They both referenced the same comparable
of calculation.
company Betas but measured them over different periods (five years
136
versus two years) and unlevered them in a different manner. Vice
Chancellor Strine rejected both methods and instead averaged four
separate Beta calculations—the median of the petitioners’ and
respondent’s experts’ Betas and the average Betas of four core
137
companies over two-year and five-year horizons.
This decision to
average the four Betas in this manner is not supported by the
literature as an accepted method to calculate Beta for a private
138
corporation. Nonetheless, Vice Chancellor Strine computed a Beta
of 1.20 versus 1.22 for the respondent’s expert and 1.04 for the
139
petitioners’ expert.
He then inputted these numbers into the
140
CAPM to arrive at a WACC of 13.92%. He then inexplicably
131. BREARLY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 532-36.
132. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *14-*16; see also supra note 83 for a discussion
of the CAPM and the return on equity and their respective roles in the calculation of
WACC.
133. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *14. Because Vice Chancellor Strine had
decided to set an all-equity capital structure for PFPC, WACC for these purposes was
PFPC’s cost of equity. Vice Chancellor Strine therefore was not required to
determine the corporation’s cost of debt or marginal tax rate. BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 14, at 531. In any event, a market risk premium of seven percent is higher
than what recent academic studies believe is correct. DIMSON ET AL., supra note 85, at
211-12.
134. For a definition of Beta and its role in the CAPM, see supra note 83.
135. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *15.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *15.
139. See DAMODARAN, supra note 74, at 198 (stating that average Beta should be
computed using market-weighted or equal-weighted averages of the comparable
companies). As noted, Vice Chancellor Strine also stated that the experts did not
unlever their Betas in an identical way. Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *15.
However, he did not discuss in the opinion how they or he conducted the required
comparable company Beta unlevering. Id.; see also PRATT ET AL., supra note 14, at 16768 (outlining requirement to unlever comparable company Betas to adjust their
capital structure to that of the valued corporation).
140. Id.
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141

rounded down this percentage to 13.5%.
Using this 13.5% figure
to discount back the modified management projections and terminal
value, Vice Chancellor Strine arrived at a discounted cash flow value
142
for PFPC of $32.08.
Is this right? Well, no. There are obvious flaws in Vice Chancellor
Strine’s valuation. The calculation of the equity discount rate,
including Beta and terminal values, as well as the market risk rate
employed and manner of readjusting PFPC’s capital structure to an
all-equity model each appear to be contrary to agreed finance
143
methodology.
Additionally, some of the chosen numbers, such as
the terminal value, perpetual growth rate, and final discount rate
144
However, a critique of the Delaware court’s
seem capricious.
valuation practices, although certainly needed, is not the purpose of
145
this Part.
Rather, the goal here is to illustrate the issues outlined
supra at Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2 and the effect of an absence of any
clear-cut valuation guidelines or standards and a body administering
146
them.
Practitioners and even the judiciary itself therefore apply
their own subjective biases with no coherence to valuation using
147
different “pick-and-choose” methods and approaches.
The
consequences are evidenced by the three quite different discounted
cash flow figures ($21.35, $32.08, and $61.76) produced in
148
Andaloro.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *16.
143. See supra notes 112-142 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 122-142 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 106 for a citation of articles that have in part addressed this
topic.
146. This is also illustrated by the comparable company analysis conducted by the
Court of Chancery in Andaloro. In Andaloro, the petitioner’s expert did not conduct a
comparable company analysis for valuation purposes because he believed it was not
feasible in light of PFPC’s past, poor performance and situation as well as the stock
market decline in 2002. 2005 WL 2045640, at *15. The respondent’s expert
disagreed and did conduct such an analysis, as did Vice Chancellor Strine. However,
both Vice Chancellor Strine and respondent’s expert again came up with different
numbers and used differing methodologies in deriving these numbers, albeit with
some overlap. Id. at *16-*20. Vice Chancellor Strine then ascribed two-thirds weight
to the discounted cash flow analysis and one-third weight to the comparable
company analysis to derive an ultimate valuation of PFPC of $32.81. Id. at *20. He
provided greater weight to the discounted cash flow analysis due to the presence of
what he perceived as “responsible” management projections and the superiority of
this technique for valuation purposes when such information is available. Id. The
subjectivity problem here, even in this cursory summary, is again transparent.
147. The criticism here is not directed at Vice Chancellor Strine. Rather, the
opinion in Andaloro is meticulous and shows a judge struggling mightily (and
admirably) to practice the art of valuation amidst highly divergent views and a lack of
set guidelines or standards.
148. The results in Andaloro are also not the only examples in the Delaware
appraisal context of the valuation disparities which can arise when valuation is
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B. The Conflicts Problem
The discretion and divergence in valuation practice outlined supra
compounds a procedural concern with fairness opinion practice.
The typical issuers of fairness opinions, investment banks, have been
subject to repeated criticism for potential and actual conflicts in the
149
rendering of these opinions. The primary issue is this: investment
banks delivering fairness opinions in a corporate control transaction
typically are also retained to render general financial advice with
150
respect to the relevant transaction. They are well-compensated for
this work. The fee can be millions of dollars: the amount variant
151
The manner of
depending upon the transaction size.
compensation is a success fee payable to the bank at transaction
152
milestones such as announcement or completion.
The
compensation for a fairness opinion is often subsumed into this
larger fee and is therefore also dependent upon the transaction’s
153
occurrence. The investment bank therefore has a hefty incentive to
ensure that the contemplated transaction for which it will issue a
conducted in these circumstances. See, e.g., In re Emerging Communications, Inc.
S’holders Litig., 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. 2004) (noting that respondent’s expert
calculated discounted cash flow of $10.38 per share and petitioners’ expert
calculated discounted cash flow of $41.16 per share; court calculated discounted
cash flow value of $38.05 per share); Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL
1152338 (Del. Ch. 2004) (noting that respondent’s expert calculated going concern
value of $20.00 per share and petitioners’ expert calculated going concern value of at
least $35.00 per share; court valued corporation at $32.76 per share).
149. See infra at Parts III.B and III.D for a review of such criticism by regulators
and academics; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Dealbook; Good Deals for Banks, Both
Coming and Going, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2004, at C1 (criticizing conflicted practices by
investment banks in the rendering of fairness opinions); Gretchen Morgenson,
Mirror, Mirror, Who is the Unfairest, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at C31 (discussing
regulator inquiries into conflicted fairness opinion practices by investment banks).
150. E.g., MAYTAG PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 63 (retaining an investment
bank to render financial advice with approximately ninety percent of fee contingent
upon success of the transaction); The Gillette Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form
DEFM14A), at 54, 56 (May 27, 2005) (retaining two investment banks to render
financial advice with a substantial part of their fee contingent upon the success of the
transaction) [hereinafter Gillette Proxy Statement]; AT&T PROXY STATEMENT, supra
note 26, at 41 (retaining investment bank to render financial advice with
approximately ninety-one percent of fee contingent upon success of the transaction).
See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at 265-67 (detailing the typical structure of
investment bank financial advisory fees).
151. E.g., MAYTAG PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 63 (estimating fee paid to
investment bank at approximately $17.4 million for financial advice and a fairness
opinion); GILLETTE PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 150, at 54, 56 (disclosing fee paid
to two investment banks at $30 million each for financial advice and a fairness
opinion); AT&T PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 26, at 41 (estimating fee paid to
investment bank at $29 million for financial advice and a fairness opinion); PLAINS
RESOURCES PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 74 (estimating fee paid to investment
bank at approximately $2.05 million for financial advice and a fairness opinion).
152. See supra note 151 for example transactions.
153. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 265-67.
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fairness opinion progresses to completion. But, conflict arises where
a bank is asked to opine and advise on a transaction that it stands to
benefit from only if the transaction transpires. In fact, under the fee
structure explicated above the bank will not be paid if it cannot find
fairness. This charge can be made even if the fairness opinion
compensation is paid separate from the larger success fee. If the
transaction occurs, the remaining overall compensation is significant
154
enough to raise conflict issues.
This explicit conflict is also accompanied by a more subtle one.
The relationships between investment banks and corporate
management can run deep, and an investment bank often has
business with the corporation and its management that span more
than one transaction. In these situations, investment banks may be
influenced to find a transaction fair to avoid irritating management
and other corporate actors who stand to benefit from the
155
transaction. This will ensure future lucrative business.
Finally, there are other situations where investment banks do not
do themselves proud. For example, they often maintain business
interests that extend to both sides of a corporate control transaction

154. Even if separated out, fairness opinion fees themselves are often quite large
and sustaining of an argument that incentives are misaligned. See, e.g., In re TeleCommunications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at *10
(Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that contingent fee payable to investment bank of
approximately $40 million “creates a serious issue of material fact, as to whether
[investment bank] . . . . could provide independent advice to the Special
Committee”). In some instances, to refute this charge, the fee is payable whether or
not the bank is able to render a fairness opinion. E.g., PLAINS RESOURCES PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 74 (disclosing that $1 million fee for fairness opinion is
payable regardless of the conclusion expressed by the investment bank in the
opinion). However, many fee arrangements are dependent upon delivery of a
fairness opinion. E.g., 7 Eleven, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement
(Form SC 14D9), at 3 (Sept. 19, 2005) (disclosing that a $1.25 million fee for a
fairness opinion is due when opinion is delivered); NYSE Group, Inc., Registration
Statement (Form S-4), at 78 (July 21, 2005) (disclosing that $500,000 of a $2 million
fee for a fairness opinion was due upon execution of an engagement letter with the
remaining $1.5 million due upon delivery of the opinion). In addition, if the fee is
not contingent upon a fairness determination, management and other pressures
arguably still force investment banks towards the “right” fairness conclusion. See infra
note 155 (citing evidence of management influence on investment bank fairness
opinions).
155. See, e.g., Kahn v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., No. 12489, 1996 WL
159628, at *9 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting evidence of investment bank revising its
fairness opinion from negative to positive at management’s behest in order to secure
future business); see also Timothy L. O’Brien, The Man With the Golden Slingshot, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2005, at C1 (describing the verdict of $1.45 billion issued to Ron L.
Perelman’s affiliates against Morgan Stanley with respect to the acquisition of
Coleman by Sunbeam based upon claims that the investment bank, advisor to
Sunbeam, “conceal[ed] Sunbeam’s true financial condition” due to its lending
relationship with Sunbeam and millions in fees earned).
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156

and beyond their own opinion. The most common example today
is stapled-financing. In its most prominent form, an acquiree, in an
auction situation, will offer the acquirer a financing package that is
157
sponsored by the acquiree’s investment bank.
This is termed
stapled-financing. The bank will render a fairness opinion to the
acquiree board and, once the transaction is negotiated and agreed to,
158
switch-sides and provide acquisition financing to the acquirer. The
added conflict here, beyond the fact of dual-representation, is that
the investment bank has an incentive for a lower target price so that
the acquirer will not be over-leveraged after the acquisition and
therefore be better positioned to repay the indebtedness incurred to
159
the investment bank.
1. The search for meaning
There are substantial criticisms outlined above that can be levied
against the fairness opinion, but there are two important distinctions
to be made in its defense. First, in light of the criticism levied supra at
Parts II.A and II.B, it would not be surprising if one completely
discredited valuation analysis. This would be incorrect. Valuation
today is an imperfect science; however, empirical research has proven
160
that it can materially and beneficially inform as to value.
Furthermore, exact certainty as to price other than through market156. For example, when JP Morgan acquired Bank One in 2004 the fairness
opinion for JP Morgan was rendered by JP Morgan itself. Morgenson, supra note
149; see also Sorkin, supra note 149 (criticizing investment banks who render fairness
opinions while also participating in multiple aspects of the transaction).
157. See generally Ari Nathanson, Mid-Market I-Banks Keen On Stapled Financing,
BUYOUTS, Sept. 5, 2005, at 2005 WLNR 14049532 (noting the increased use of
stapled-financing).
158. See id. (explaining the incentives and benefits leading investment banks to
provide stapled-financing).
159. See Sorkin, supra note 149 (criticizing acquiree-side investment banks who
render fairness opinions and also provide stapled-financing); see also In re Toys “R’’
Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1006 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that board
decision to permit post-agreement stapled-financing by investment bank who
rendered fairness opinion to board was not inappropriate but “was unfortunate, in
that it tends to raise eyebrows by creating the appearance of impropriety”). In fact,
due to the issues raised, both Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse now recommend that
clients obtain a second, separate fairness opinion when the bank represents the
acquiree and provides stapled-financing. Michael J. Halloran & Jessica L. Hackman,
Overview of Liability Issues Confronting Investment Banks:
Emphasis on Mergers and
Acquisitions 9 No. 1 M & A LAWYER 20 (May 2005).
160. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 198-210 (outlining empirical
studies finding utility of valuation techniques); GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 73,
at 158-68, 175-212 (outlining empirical tests finding utility of valuation techniques).
See generally John Graham & Harvey Campbell, The Theory and Practice of Corporate
Finance: Evidence from the Field, 60 J. OF FIN. ECON. 187 (2001); Steven N. Kaplan &
Richard S. Ruback, The Valuation of Cash Flow Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis, 50 J. OF
FIN. ECON. 1059 (1995).
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based mechanisms will never be possible, but continuing research
and study is making valuation practice and techniques more accurate
161
every day. The issue in the fairness opinion context arises from the
subjectivity inherent in this valuation process combined with the
conflicted nature of the preparers and failure to follow best practices.
However, an unconflicted valuation conducted with rigor and
discipline in accordance with current academic precepts and without
biased manipulation of subjective inputs can materially inform as to
162
value.
Second, valuation can inform as to value but it is not a prediction
of price. There are numerous examples of fairness opinions
rendered to acquirees in corporate control transactions where later
offers emerged for higher, sometimes substantially higher,
163
amounts.
A recent investigation by the Massachusetts Secretary of
the Commonwealth into the fairness opinion delivered to the board
of Gillette in connection with its acquisition by Procter & Gamble
(“P&G”) focused on whether Gillette’s investment banks violated the
Massachusetts Security Act by issuing a fairness opinion in light of
what the attorney general believed was the low price offered by
164
P&G. It is this miscomprehension which often drives the criticism
of fairness opinions: the search for metaphysical certainty in
valuation practice. Yet, this is not the fairness opinion’s or valuation’s
161. See supra note 14 (citing academic review of these developments).
162. See supra note 160 for citation of studies on the efficacy of valuation; see also
DAMODARAN, supra note 74; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 265-68 (outlining rigorous,
benchmark fairness opinion preparation procedures); Andrew L. Bab et al., Faulty
Assumptions, THE DAILY DEAL, Sept. 3, 2004 (arguing that “[c]ritics of fairness
opinions appear not only to misunderstand their purpose, but also to overlook the
meticulous work and rigorous vetting that goes into them . . . .”).
163. There are literally hundreds of examples. Two of recent note are first,
Maytag’s agreement to be acquired by Whirlpool at a price of $21 after a prior
agreement to be acquired for $14 a share. Whirlpool Corp., Registration Statement
(Form S-4), at 48, 57 (Sept. 29, 2005). Second, Guidant’s agreement to be acquired
by Boston Scientific at a price of $80 a share after a prior agreement to be acquired
at approximately $64. Guidant Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A),
at 86 (Mar. 3, 2006). Fairness opinions were rendered to the acquiree with respect to
the initial acquisition price in both instances.
164. GILLETTE PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 150, at 40. For further discussion of
the Massachusetts investigation, see generally Brent Shearer, State Officials Get Tough On
Regulation of M&A, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: DEALMAKERS J., Aug. 1, 2005; Andrew
Ross Sorkin, You Can Call It a Fairness Opinion, But That Wouldn’t Be Fair, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2005, at C33 (reporting William F Galvin, Massachusetts secretary of state,
has accused Gillette’s investment banks of rubber stamping a below-market sale
price). See also Andrew Caffey, Markey to Open Probe into Fairness Opinions, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 7, 2005, at D2 (stating “US Representative Edward J. Markey, Democrat
of Malden, said he will investigate the so-called fairness opinions that investment
banks issue to corporate clients in mergers and acquisitions”); Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Mergers: Fair Should Be Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at C6 (discussing inherent
conflicts with investment bank fairness opinions in corporate control transactions).
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purpose. In the corporate control transaction, fairness opinions do
not exist to select the correct or even highest price that would or
could be paid. This is impossible given the limitations of valuation
165
today, information disparities, and simple game theory.
Rather, I
believe the fairness opinion aids the board in satisfaction of its duty of
care by providing confidence that the price offered for the sale or
purchase of a corporation is within a reasonable range for a
corporate control transaction of this nature. This is not price.
III. RESPONSE TO THE FAIRNESS OPINION
This Part examines the fairness opinion post-Van Gorkom. More
specifically, it discusses the regulatory, judicial, and academic
response to fairness opinions and their increased utilization. First, I
examine Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) regulatory
action vis-à-vis fairness opinions both pre- and post-Van Gorkom.
Thereafter, I survey the responses of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (“NASD”), Delaware courts, and academia.
A. The SEC Response
The SEC has adopted a disclosure-based approach to the treatment
of fairness opinions in corporate control transactions. The SEC has
promulgated these disclosure requirements in two categories of
166
takeover regulation:
going-private transactions
and proxy
167
Surprisingly, the SEC has not proposed or otherwise
solicitations.
168
extended these disclosure obligations to the cash tender offer.
In 1979, the SEC adopted rules governing going-private
169
transactions by public companies and affiliated entities.
The SEC
165. See generally BREARLY & MYERS, supra note 14, at 716 (noting acquirer has
information that is often unavailable publicly or to acquiree); Bernard Black, Bidder
Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1989) (arguing that acquirers tend to
overpay in corporate control transactions); Carney, supra note 10, at 533-36
(discussing limitations of valuation in the context of predicting the price an acquirer
is willing or otherwise agrees to pay); Kenton K. Yee, Control Premiums, Minority
Discounts, and Optimal Judicial Valuation, 48 J.L. & ECON. 517 (Oct. 2005) (reviewing
methodology to calculate acquirer control premiums).
166. For a definition of a going-private transaction, see supra note 3.
167. The definition of “proxy” and a “solicitation” for purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), are set forth in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-1 (2005).
168. This is inexplicable. If there is a need to disclose information concerning the
fairness opinion in a corporate control transaction then the manner in which it is
conducted (i.e., stockholder vote through a proxy solicitation or cash tender offer)
should not affect the disclosure requirement.
169. Going-Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-16075, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 82166 (Aug. 2, 1979) [hereinafter Going-Private Adopting Release].
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prescribed these rules in order to bestow added protections to
unaffiliated stockholders due to their susceptibility for abuse in these
170
transactions. In these rules, the SEC set forth the first meaningful,
explicit requirement under the federal securities laws for public
disclosure of fairness opinions and their underlying analyses.
Additionally, the new going-private rules mandated disclosure
concerning potential conflicts-of-interest for any investment bank
171
rendering a fairness opinion in such transactions.
172
The SEC set forth these strictures in new Rule 13e-3. Rule 13e-3
required, and still requires, that a corporation or affiliate thereof
implementing a Rule 13e-3 going-private transaction be subject to the
increased disclosure and filing obligations set forth in Schedule 13e173
3. Schedule 13e-3 obligates the filer to disclose whether or not the
corporation or its affiliate has received a fairness opinion or similar
174
report, and, if so, to furnish a summary of the fairness opinion. In
addition, the fairness opinion must be filed as an exhibit to the
175
Schedule.
The Schedule also requires that any underlying written
analyses (e.g., the board book), or any other report prepared by the
investment bank in connection with the fairness opinion, must be
176
attached as an exhibit to the Schedule.
The Schedule 13e-3 fairness opinion summary disclosure
requirements are not specific: they require disclosure of the bases for
and methods of arriving at the finding of fairness but do not provide
any guidance as to the scope or content of this mandated
177
disclosure. However, the SEC staff review of, and comment upon,
Schedule 13e-3s has provided such definition. More specifically,
170. See Going-Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-14185, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 81366, at 88736-39 (Nov. 17, 1977) (outlining various prior abusive
practices undertaken by affiliates in going-private transactions) [hereinafter GoingPrivate Proposing Release].
171. See GOING-PRIVATE ADOPTING RELEASE, supra note 169, at 82124-25.
172. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2005); see also GOING-PRIVATE ADOPTING RELEASE, supra
note 169, at 82125-31 (providing an overview of Rule 13e-3’s requirements).
173. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(d) (2005).
174. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(e) (2005).
175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (2005) (Item 16).
176. Id. This can be interpreted to include oral reports delivered to the board; see
Applicability of Item 9 of Schedule 13E-3 to Purchase Price Allocation Reports, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108650 (Sept. 30, 1987) (requiring “oral presentation
[to] be summarized fairly” and filed as an exhibit to the Schedule 13E-3). Drafts of
fairness opinions, board books and other analyses provided to the board may also
require disclosure. The staff of the SEC has been known to query whether such
drafts were provided to the board and to require disclosure of any material
differences in these drafts and the final versions. Meredith M. Brown & Gregory V.
Gooding, What’s Different About Going-Private, 13 No. 8 INSIGHTS 14, 16 (Sept. 1999).
177. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (2005) (Item 9).
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since 1979, the staff of the SEC has regularly interpreted Schedule
13e-3 to require disclosure of the methodologies utilized in preparing
a fairness opinion, the results of such methodologies, and the basis
178
for selecting each one. The extent of this obligatory disclosure has
varied with the intensity of SEC review but has commonly tracked the
179
disclosure made by investment banks in their board books. In this
regard, the staff of the SEC has most frequently required disclosure
of the discount rates and terminal value used in a discounted cash
flow analysis and the companies referenced in a comparable
180
company’s analysis. However, rarely has the SEC staff gone further
and required disclosure of all material inputs in the selected
calculations, such as requiring full disclosure of the method of
181
computation of the discount rate in a discounted cash flow analysis.
Schedule 13e-3 also requires disclosure of certain potential
investment banking conflicts. The Schedule mandates disclosure of
“any material relationship that existed during the past two years or is
mutually understood to be contemplated . . . .” between the
corporation receiving the fairness opinion and the investment bank
182
rendering the fairness opinion and each of their affiliates.
The
“compensation received or to be received” by the investment bank as
183
SEC staff
a result of any such relationship must also be disclosed.
review has again delineated the true contours of this disclosure.
However, this review has been hit or miss. While the staff has
sometimes required full disclosure of relationship details as well as
184
monetary and other compensation provided, it has also frequently
permitted boiler-plate responses. This boiler-plate typically was
descriptive rather than numerical and did not detail the true nature
178. Edward D. Herlihy et al., Disclosure of the Analyses Underlying Investment Banker
Fairness Opinions, 6 No. 3 INSIGHTS 11, 11 (1992).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Shopko Stores, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), at
64 (Nov. 23, 2005); Brookstone, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A),
at 50-51 (Aug. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Brookstone Proxy Statement]; WORLDWIDE
PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 21, at 17-18; SUNGARD PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 92,
at 34-35, 40-41. Thus, while filers might do otherwise voluntarily, SEC disclosure
requirements under Rule 13e-3 have generally been limited to disclosure of the
analyses set forth in the board book. But see Vermont Teddy Bear, Inc., Definitive
Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 41-42 (Sept. 20, 2005) (disclosing cash flow
numbers discounted and choice of the CAPM to calculate return on equity as well as
the risk free rate, market risk premium and Beta utilized in the CAPM calculation).
182. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (2005) (Item 9).
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., PLAINS RESOURCES PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 74 (disclosing
that the investment bank “has in the past provided financial advisory services to
Plains Resources and, since 2000, has received fees totaling $2,845,000 for such
services”).
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and extent of the investment bank and corporate relationship, past
and present, nor the amount of compensation received by the
185
investment bank.
In 1986, the SEC comprehensively revised the proxy rules and
adopted stated disclosure requirements for fairness opinions
provided in corporate control transactions similar to those within
186
Rule 13e-3 and Schedule 13e-3.
The only notable difference was
that these revised proxy rules did not mandate disclosure of board
books and other related financial analyses delivered by an investment
187
bank to the board.
However, while the explicated rules were
similar, the staff of the SEC adopted a different approach in its
implementing review. The SEC staff, in fact, took a “hands-off”
188
position of no review at all.
Accordingly, until the early 1990s,
disclosure in proxy statements with respect to fairness opinions was
quite limited and typically confined to a summary of the opinion
189
itself.
However, in the early 1990s, the SEC staff revised these
practices, initiating rigorous review on level with SEC review of
190
The
Schedule 13e-3 statements and requiring similar disclosure.
SEC did not, either in the early 1990s or thereafter, state a reason for
this shift.
In more recent times, the SEC has again reverted to a more
relaxed review process for proxy statements. As a result, the majority
of proxy statement filers in corporate control transaction today
disclose only bare information with respect to the assumptions
underlying the fairness opinion valuation analyses—this is oftentimes
the discount rates and terminal value methodology utilized for a
discounted cash flow analysis and the companies referenced for a
comparable companies analysis. Filers also now often make boilerplate disclosure that describes fees and relationships as “customary”
185. See, e.g., SINOPEC SCHEDULE 13E-3, supra note 31, at Ex. A(5)(v), p.36 (Jan. 20,
2005) (disclosing that investment bank received a “customary” fee for rendering the
fairness opinion); BROOKSTONE PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 181, at 52 (disclosing
that investment bank provided services to “affiliates of the members of the investor
group” for unspecified “compensation”).
186. Proxy Rules—Comprehensive Review, Exchange Act Release No. 34-23789
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83901 (Nov. 10, 1986). The
SEC also adopted similar rules for Form S-4 registration statements filed in
connection with securities offerings involving a corporate control transaction under
Rule 145 or an exchange offer. Id.
187. However, since the early 1990s the SEC has often requested confidential
submission of board books to ensure that the fairness opinion public disclosure is
consistent with the book’s contents. Herlihy et al., supra note 178, at 11-12.
188. Id. at 12-13.
189. Id. at 11.
190. See id. at 13 (discussing the SEC’s increased proxy statement disclosure
requirements for fairness opinions).

DAVIDOFF_PRINTER

1594

8/12/2006 2:13:10 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1557

and as existent, rather than disclosing specific numbers or the details
of relationships. This has been true at times even of the fee paid for
the fairness opinion itself.191 In light of this backsliding and backand-forth, public pronouncement of the SEC staff’s policy on fairness
opinion disclosure would be helpful for consistency’s sake, if nothing
else.
The SEC has not provided any justification for the aforementioned
disclosure obligations other than a single statement in the goingprivate proposing release that the fairness opinion disclosure
requirements adopted therein “are intended to ensure full disclosure
concerning the material elements in the determination of the
192
consideration to be offered . . . .”
Beyond this, it can be surmised
that the SEC adopted these disclosure obligations to align with the
general tenor of the new going-private rules—providing stockholders
with information as to price equivalent to that placed before the
board in a going-private transaction and sufficient for an educated
193
stockholder investment decision. This would conceivably limit the
potential for abuse of these stockholders by an affiliate or the
194
corporation itself.
The rationale for SEC extension of these
strictures in the revised proxy rules has never been stated but is
presumably based in part upon these same principles.
Nor has the SEC ever recognized or even acknowledged any issues
with fairness opinion practice or assessed the intrinsic worth of these
opinions. Instead, the SEC disclosure requirements ab initio assumed
the fairness opinion’s significance and the usefulness of at least
partial disclosure of the underlying valuation analyses. In addition,
beyond the disclosure requirements enumerated above, the SEC has
never addressed the issue of investment banks rendering fairness
opinions and their potential conflicted status. The absence on both
counts is a bit puzzling since such recognition should presumably
form the foundation for any rule-making on this subject.
Nevertheless, this is what has unfolded.

191. See, e.g., Scientific Atlanta, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form
DEFM14A), at 24-25 (Jan. 3, 2006) (stating that investment bank “in the past ha[s]
provided, and in the future may provide, investment banking and other financial
services” to acquiree and that it would received a “customary” fee for its services for
the current fairness opinion); American Water Works, Inc., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 26 (Dec. 5, 2001) (disclosing that the investment
bank was paid a “customary” fee for the fairness opinion and advisory services).
192. GOING-PRIVATE PROPOSING RELEASE, supra note 170, at 88752.
193. Id. at 88750-53.
194. See id. at 88738 (arguing that SEC regulation of going-private transactions is
necessary to maintain full investor confidence in the U.S. capital markets).
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B. The National Association of Securities Dealers Response
The only other significant regulatory action with respect to fairness
195
opinions has been the recent, in-progress rule-making of the NASD.
In November 2004, the NASD promulgated a notice to members
requesting comment on whether to propose new rules “that would
address procedures, disclosure requirements, and conflicts of interest
when members provide fairness opinions in corporate control
196
More specifically, the NASD requested comments
transactions.”
concerning methods to “improve the processes by which investment
197
banks render fairness opinions and manage inherent conflicts.”
The NASD put forth three reasons for requesting comment. First,
the disclosure mandated under SEC regulation for fairness opinions
could be perceived as insufficient “to inform investors about the
198
subjective nature of some opinions and their potential biases.”
Second, fairness opinions are by nature subjective and consequently
there has arisen a “perceived tendency” that these opinions often
199
support management. Finally, unaffiliated stockholders sometimes
do not receive the benefits in a corporate control transaction that
management, directors or other employees do.
The NASD
hypothesized that this disparity may create biases in favor of the
transaction if the people involved in the current or future hiring of
200
the investment bank are those with a differential benefit.
The NASD subsequently proposed rule 2290 in response to
201
solicited member comments.
Rule 2290 was announced and filed
with the SEC for approval on June 22, 2005, and, in response to SEC

195. The NASD is a self-regulating organization, and the private regulator of the
U.S. securities industry. Every securities firm doing business with the American
public must register with the NASD, and all of the bulge-bracket, multi-function
investment banks and most other investment banks are members of the NASD and
subject to its regulation. See generally Maria A. Volarich, Note, Easing the Regulation of
a Pan-European Securities Market: Applying the Recommendations of the Rudman Report to
Easdaq, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2230, 2241-44 (1996) (outlining the history and role of
the NASD). The SEC has oversight of, and ability to regulate, the NASD under
Section 19 of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (2005).
196. Request For Comment—Fairness Opinions Issued by Members, NASD Notice
to Members 04-83, at 1009 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.nasd.com/
web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_012249.
197. Id. at 1012.
198. Id. at 1011.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1012.
201. Proposed Rule Change to Establish New NASD Rule 2290 Regarding Fairness
Opinions, SR-NASD-2005-080 (June 22, 2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/
web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_014559. The NASD
received twenty comment letters, available at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?Idc
Service=SSGET_ PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_012249&ssTargetNodeId=567.
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comments, amended three times.202 The rule was published in the
Federal Register on April 11, 2006.203 It is currently in a comment
period, and will likely be approved by the SEC in the coming months,
thereby becoming effective under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended.204
Rule 2290 in its current form sets forth requirements for the
disclosure of potential conflicts and minimum procedures with
respect to NASD member investment bank’s internal approval and
vetting of fairness opinions.205 The rule is primarily one of mandated
disclosure triggered only if a fairness opinion is provided or otherwise
referenced to public stockholders.
In such a situation, four
categories of disclosure are required. First, all compensation payable
to the member investment bank that is contingent upon the
successful completion of the transaction must be disclosed in the
fairness opinion.206 Second, any material relationship that existed
during the two years prior to the rendering of the fairness opinion or
is contemplated between the companies involved in the transaction
and the member investment bank must be disclosed in the fairness
opinion.207 Third, the fairness opinion must state whether or not it
has been approved or issued by a fairness committee.208 Finally, the
fairness opinion must disclose the categories of information that
formed a substantial basis for the fairness opinion and whether any
such information in each such category was independently verified by
the member investment bank.209
The rule in its current proposed form is largely uneventful and a
disappointment given the NASD acknowledgement of the issues
before it.210 The procedural requirements for internal fairness
202. Amendment Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to Proposed Rule Change to Establish New
NASD Rule 2290 Regarding Fairness Opinions, SR-NASD-2005-080 (Nov. 30, 2005),
available at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDoc
Name=NASDW014559 .
203. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, and 3
thereto to Establish New NASD Rule 2290 Regarding Fairness Opinions, 71 Fed. Reg.
34-53598 (Apr. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Proposed Rule Change Regarding Fairness
Opinions].
204. This is legally required under Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act. 15
U.S.C.A. § 78s(b) (2005).
205. PROPOSED RULE CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at
18395 (Proposed Rule 2290).
206. Id. (Proposed Rule 2290(a)(1), (2)).
207. Id. (Proposed Rule 2290(a)(3)).
208. Id. (Proposed Rule 2290(a)(5)).
209. Id. (Proposed Rule 2290(a)(4)).
210. Several commentators argued for stronger medicine, including prohibiting
investment banks from receiving success fees if rendering a fairness opinion,
requiring disclosure of all material inputs in the preparation of any underlying
valuation analysis, requiring distinct disclosure of fairness opinion fees from general
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opinion approval are, with one significant exception, already largely
followed voluntarily by the investment banks.211 This exception is a
provision requiring a regulated investment bank rendering a fairness
opinion to follow a procedure which evaluates “whether the amount
and nature of the compensation from the transactions underlying the
fairness opinion benefiting any individual officers, directors or
employees, or class of such persons, relative to the benefits to
shareholders of the company is a factor in reaching a fairness
determination.”212 I have read and re-read this provision and the
NASD commentary upon it. While the purpose can be easily
surmised—addressing inordinate retention and compensation paid
in connection with change of control transactions—I look forward to
learning how the investment banks implement this provision, because
I honestly do not know how they can or will other than via the usual
boiler-plate response. In any event, this requirement misapprehends
what a fairness opinion does and opines to. Retention and other
compensatory arrangements do arguably result in a lower price to
acquiree stockholders, but do not affect whether the ultimate price
itself is fair within the financial parameters of the value of the
corporation or the consideration paid. To rephrase the point, the
price can be financially fair in a corporate control transaction but the
retention and other compensatory arrangements still egregious.
Trying to analyze them together scrambles the egg.213 The NASD
should address these issues separately.
The disclosure requirements of the rule were watered down in the
NASD and SEC review process. The NASD ultimately did not go so
far as to require member investment banks to disclose “any significant
214
conflicts of interest” as it initially considered.
Instead, the
disclosure requirements with respect to contingent consideration and

advisory fees and the adoption of a code of best practices for fairness opinion
preparation. See inter alia comments of CalPERS (submitted Feb. 1, 2005), Charles
M. Elson et al. (submitted Dec. 21, 2004) and Standard & Poor’s Corporate Value
Consulting (submitted Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/
idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_012249&ssTargetNodeId=56;
see also Ann Davis, Wall Street's ‘Fairness Opinions’ Draw Fire From Calpers, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 8, 2005, at C1 (discussing CalPERs comments on the NASD proposed Rule
2290).
211. PROPOSED RULE CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at
18395 (Rule 2290(b)).
212. PROPOSED RULE CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at
18395 (Rule 2290(b)(3)).
213. The issue of fairness opinions and retention and compensatory arrangements
is discussed further supra note 27.
214. PROPOSED RULE CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at
18397.
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relationships largely overlap with current federal securities law.
The two other disclosure obligations concerning opinion committees
and independent verification of information will likely be met with
more boiler-plate responses—a practice which the rule effectively
216
permits.
Furthermore, in the amending releases the NASD also
relaxed the rule’s bite; removing a good bit of the potential for it to
go beyond SEC regulation. For example, the NASD took the position
in the amending releases that disclosure of contingent compensation
and material relationships under the rule can be descriptive and not
217
quantitative; a statement as to whether it exists or not sufficient.
Yet, the number is the important element here: if the amount is high
it has more potential to result in bias.218 In addition, the rule does
nothing about the subjectivity inherent in fairness opinion
preparation. It simply addresses the conflicts issue with redundant
disclosure requirements, which permit investment banks to engage in
the similar practices with little, if any change.
However, there is hope. The NASD has achieved something the
SEC has not. The NASD has actually recognized problems with
fairness opinion practice today. It is here that I believe the value of
these new NASD rules will ultimately lie, in their unrealized potential
and significance in the recognition by a regulator of underlying
problems with fairness opinion practice and the limited regulation
thereof put forth by the SEC. The SEC and other corporate actors
now have no excuse: the NASD has put them on notice.
C. The Delaware Courts Response
1. The fairness opinion’s enduring strength
Steadfast would be a good description of the Delaware courts’
treatment of fairness opinions post-Van Gorkom. The courts have
215. See supra Part III.A (outlining federal securities law fairness opinion
disclosure requirements). The rule requires disclosure of “material relationships”
between the member investment bank and all of the companies involved in the
transaction, as opposed to the federal requirement that only relationships with the
fairness opinion recipient need be disclosed. However, contrary to the federal
requirement, the rule does not require that relationships between the investment
bank’s affiliates and the fairness opinion recipient be disclosed. See PROPOSED RULE
CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at 18397.
216. PROPOSED RULE CHANGE REGARDING FAIRNESS OPINIONS, supra note 203, at
18398.
217. Id. at 18397.
218. This is particularly true, since, unless forced by SEC staff comments, filers
arguably do not need to disclose these numbers. See supra notes 185-191. See also In
re Tele-Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at
*10 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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explicitly and repeatedly clung to Van Gorkom’s holding that a wellprepared financial analysis from either management or an outside
advisor is necessary but that a fairness opinion is not. So, for
example, the Court of Chancery recently stated that in the corporate
control transaction “fairness opinions . . . are generally not essential,
219
as a matter of law, to support an informed business judgment,” a
statement that had been reiterated by the Delaware courts
220
throughout the preceding twenty years.
However, the Delaware courts’ assertions that a fairness opinion is
not explicitly required in connection with the board’s consideration
of a corporate control transaction have been undermined by the
credence and weight paid by the courts to fairness opinions in such
paradigms. In case after case where a board’s decision-making
process has been challenged, the Delaware courts have noted the
receipt of a fairness opinion, in and of itself, as a strong, if not
dispositive, indicator that the board properly acted in making the
221
relevant decision to proceed with the transaction.
More broadly,
the courts have repeatedly and approvedly cited fairness opinions as
sufficing to provide protection from liability under title 8, section
222
141(e) of the Delaware Code. In both instances, this endorsement
has come without significant qualification or analysis such that the
219. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 984 (Del. Ch. 2000).
220. See, e.g., Merchants’ Nat’l Props., Inc. v. Meyerson, 2000 WL 1041229, at *6
(Del. Ch. 2000); Wacht v. Cont’l Hosts, Ltd., 1994 WL 525222, at *3 (Del. Ch. 1994);
Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 472 (Del. 1991).
221. See, e.g., In re Compucom Systems, Inc. Stockholders Litig., 2005 WL 2481325,
at *7 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding board reasonably relied on fairness opinions which
“were supported by a number of financial analyses”); Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. v.
Allied Riser Commc’ns Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting concerns as
to the fairness of the transaction as a whole, but taking no action as the investment
bank “has not withdrawn its fairness opinion nor has it told [the corporation] that it
may no longer rely upon it”); Ash v. McCall, 2000 WL 1370341, at *9 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(stating that retainment and advice of investment bank, together with accounting
firm, “permits one conclusion: that the [corporation’s] directors’ reliance on the
views expressed by their advisors was in good faith” and therefore the board acted
with due care); Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, 2000 WL 238026, at *6 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(noting with approval receipt of fairness opinion to sustain rejection of claim that
board breached its duty of care). See generally In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores,
Inc., 1999 WL 350473, at *13 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that “an outside financial
advisor’s opinion on the terms of a transaction generally gives the court comfort with
respect to the reasonableness of the board’s action”); Adam O. Emmerich & Paul K.
Rowe, Acquisitions Gone Sour: Whose Fault?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 2001, at S4 (asserting
that “if the acquiring firm’s board is advised by independent financial and legal
professionals who ‘green light’ the transaction, the directors will be protected from
litigation challenging their pre-closing conduct”). Cf. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (dismissing pendent
Delaware state law claims of breach of the duty of care due to, among other factors,
the board’s receipt of a fairness opinion).
222. See, e.g., Crescent/Mach I Partners, 846 A.2d at 985; In re RJR Nabisco, Inc.
S’holders Litig., 1989 WL 7036, at * 16 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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receipt of a fairness opinion appears, absent egregious factors, to per
223
Obviously, from the board and practitioner
se provide protection.
perspective the consequence is to sustain the implicit structural
requirement for these opinions.
The Delaware courts have also looked to these opinions as a
substantive determinator that can guide them in their own fairness
224
determinations. For example, in Seagraves v. Urstadt Prop. Co., Inc.,
the Court of Chancery, conducting an entire fairness analysis, stated
that in a going-private transaction, a board of directors has no legal
obligation to obtain a fairness opinion, but that the employment of
such a “procedural safeguard” will be seen as strong evidence of a fair
225
transaction. The ostensible result of the opinion’s caveat has been
to ensure a strong, if not mandatory, role for a fairness opinion in a
board recommended going-private transaction. However, it is also
yet another example of the high place Delaware courts have accorded
226
fairness opinions as stand-alone instruments.
The Delaware courts have at times acted in this manner without
any searching examination of the analyses underlying the opinion or
227
even the utility of the underlying valuation.
They also have not,
223. The Delaware courts have at times noted that a fairness opinion that is
unreasonably relied or acted upon in bad faith is not sufficient to establish the
protections of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001). Yet, cases criticizing fairness
opinions that have actually found such lack of reliance or bad faith are few and far
between, and criticism of fairness opinions in the Delaware courts has more often
occurred in the context of a failure to disclose deficiencies in the preparation of the
fairness opinion rather than in its use. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1281 (Del. 1988) (holding that to rely upon DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(e) (2001), a board “may not avoid its active and direct duty of oversight in a
matter as significant as the sale of corporate control”); Grubb v. Bagley, 1998 WL
92224, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1998) (holding that the statute insulates director’s from
liability when relying on a fairness opinion only if the board acts “reasonably in good
faith,” and that reasonable and good faith reliance are material issues of fact).
224. 1996 WL 159626, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1996).
225. Id. at *5 (citations omitted).
226. See, e.g., In re Tele-Communications, Inc. S’holders Litig. 2005 WL 3642727, at
*14 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding that defendant’s had failed to demonstrate fair price
due to board’s failure to obtain a fairness opinion analyzing the fairness of the highvote stock exchange ratio to the holders of high-vote stock and the fairness of the
low-vote stock exchange ratio to the holders of low-vote stock where two classes of
stock existed, one high-vote and the other low-vote); McMillan v. Intercargo Corp.,
768 A.2d 492, 505 n.55 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“The board’s reliance upon an investment
banker (whose independence and qualifications are not challenged in the
complaint) is another factor weighing against the plaintiffs’ ability to state an
actionable claim that the defendant directors breached their fiduciary duties by
failing to secure the highest value reasonably attainable.”); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n
Sys., Inc., 1995 WL 301403, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1995) (noting fairness opinions are
“further evidence of the fairness of the price offered”).
227. To be fair, the Delaware courts have at times in the past criticized fairness
opinions when their preparation was blatantly deficient. These cases, though, are
largely from the 1980s. See, e.g., Associated Imports, Inc. v. ASG Indus., Inc., 1984
WL 19833, at *7-*8 (Del. Ch. 1984) (criticizing investment bank for acting as a
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until recently, made any substantive recognition, beyond Van
Gorkom’s implicit distinction, between the opinion itself and the
228
valuation forming the basis of such an opinion. Instead, it can be
alleged that the Delaware courts have often endowed the fairness
opinion with an almost magical status and ability to act as a golden
ticket, alleviating an insouciant board from liability and the
transaction at hand from challenges regarding the price aspect of the
board’s duty of care.
However, the Court of Chancery recently deviated in part from this
229
practice. In In re Pure Resources, Inc., S’holders Litig., Vice Chancellor
Strine gave voice to the first Delaware Court of Chancery opinion to
recognize that the fairness opinion is merely a lightning rod and
fundamentally a function of the underlying analyses. He stated:
[C]ourts must be candid in acknowledging that the disclosure of
the banker’s “fairness opinion” alone and without more, provides
stockholders with nothing other than a conclusion, qualified by a
gauze of protective language designed to insulate the banker from
liability. The real informative value of the banker’s work is not in
its bottom-line conclusion, but in the valuation analysis that
230
buttresses that result.

Vice Chancellor Strine concluded that this information was
material to an acquiree stockholder’s informed investment decision
as to whether the price in a going-private transaction was appropriate
231
and, consequently, whether or not to accept the offer.
He
accordingly held that, in the context of a going-private transaction
involving a Delaware corporation, a fair summary of the analyses
supporting the acquiree fairness opinion must be disclosed in the
232
related tender offer documentation.
This case marked the first true recognition by the Delaware courts
of the role of the fairness opinion, the underlying analyses as key to
233
the fairness opinion’s value, and the distinction between the two.
However, In re Pure Resources was at its heart a disclosure case which
“negotiator” rather than an “expert” by preparing two separate fairness opinion
letters for delivery at a board meeting, one of which was blank); Joseph v. Shell Oil
Co., 482 A.2d 335, 343 (Del. Ch. 1984) (criticizing the failure of tender offer
materials to disclose that fairness opinion had been prepared after only eight days of
scrutiny); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (finding a lack of
fair dealing where corporation failed to disclose “cursorily” prepared fairness
opinion which was brought to the board meeting with the price left blank).
228. See infra notes 229-233 and accompanying text.
229. 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
230. Id. at 449.
231. Id. at 449-50.
232. Id. at 449.
233. Id.
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arose due to the SEC’s illogical failure to maintain similar disclosure
requirements for fairness opinions in cash tender offers as in proxy
234
solicitations and going-private transactions. The Delaware Court of
Chancery held that in the absence of such federal obligation,
Delaware law required such disclosure in the going-private, cash
235
tender offer context.
Ultimately, it is uncertain what this holding’s implications are for
fairness opinions and the weight paid to them under Delaware
jurisprudence. This is particularly true since the Delaware courts,
even in In re Pure Resources, have remained resolutely confident in the
236
worth of the valuation processes underlying a fairness opinion.
This is true despite repeated examples thrust upon these courts of
the arguable flaws in valuation practice, the embedded investment
banking conflicts inherent in the rendering of these services, and the
sometimes poor, and possibly negligent, practices by investment
237
banks.
Rather, the courts have continued to pay high regard to,
and placed confidence in, valuation techniques and their ability as
currently practiced to find meaningful prices and value ranges. The
holding of In re Pure Resources is but one such example. Another is
found in Delaware appraisal and entire fairness proceedings where
valuation techniques are routinely utilized by the Delaware courts
238
themselves and the experts who appear before them.
Here, the
courts have not only placed confidence in these practices as currently
conducted but endorsed a view that the courts are quite capable as
239
the sole arbiter in these matters. Former Chief Judge Veasey of the
Delaware Supreme Court expressed this mindset best when he stated:
The laborious process of trying an appraisal case in the Court of
Chancery, with its “battle of the experts” tendency, requires
patience and an intellectually disciplined approach by the trial
judge. As one can glean by reading the recent Court of Chancery
234. See supra note 168 and accompanying text for a discussion of this failing.
235. In re Pure Resources, 808 A.2d 421, 449-50 (Del. Ch. 2002)
236. See, e.g., id. at 449 (stating that the work of an investment bank is supported
by the “work of the judiciary itself, which closely examines the underlying analyses
performed by the investment bankers”).
237. See supra Part II for a discussion of these practices.
238. See supra Part II.A.3 for a discussion of one such example.
239. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 496 (Del. 2000) (holding
that appraisal proceedings must be entirely conducted by the judges of the Court of
Chancery and therefore “the use of masters to determine the ultimate valuation are
not permitted by the present statutory appraisal scheme”); Gonsalves v. Straight
Arrow Publishers, 701 A.2d 357, 361 (Del. 1997) (holding that the Court of Chancery
is required to “independently determine the value of the shares that are the subject
of the appraisal action”). This approach in appraisal proceedings has been partially
fostered upon the courts by the terms of the Delaware appraisal statute itself. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2005).
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appraisal cases, there is much for bankers, M&A lawyers, and
corporate officials (including directors) to learn and apply in any
major M&A transaction. It would be a wise step for the participants
240
in such transactions to review and analyze some of the cases . . . .

Thus, in the world-view of the Delaware courts, the issues raised
supra at Part II are not particularly relevant for placing the fairness
opinion’s role in the corporate control transaction. Valuation, as
practiced today, is not only a reliable indicator of both price and
value, but the Delaware courts are a first choice for conducting these
machinations. The fairness opinion itself has equivalent status as a
reflection of these analyses to the extent that any distinguishment is
even attempted. The consequences of this attitude and perspective
are not surprising; the Delaware courts have repeatedly relied,
without material question, upon the fairness opinion as a virtually
required, reliable, and useful mainstay in a corporate control
transaction in satisfaction of the board’s duty of care.
2. The fairness opinion’s context
Interestingly, the role of the fairness opinion in the Delaware
takeover regime—other than as an essentially obligatory requirement
in satisfaction of the board’s duty of care—has never been explored
by the Delaware courts. The Delaware courts, post-Van Gorkom, have
241
erected in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
242
Paramount
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
243
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. and other cases a takeover
regime that permits a corporation to “just say no” and effectively
244
refuse a takeover offer.
In addition, the Delaware courts have
established a takeover code, which permits an acquiree to agree to
245
deal protection devices.
Theoretically, these devices could differ
depending upon the sale posture, i.e., through a full or modified
auction or upon agreement with one bidder subject to a postagreement market check. However, in none of these circumstances
did the Delaware court address whether variance of the sale process
240. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 1495.
241. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
242. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
243. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
244. See generally Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s
Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994).
245. Discussion of the Delaware takeover regime, its parameters and argued
failings is legion. For two more interesting and current articles, see Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to
Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Professorial Bear
Hug: The ESB Proposal as a Conscious Effort to Make the Delaware Courts Confront the
Basic “Just Say No” Question, 55 STAN. L. REV. 863 (2002).
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and structure of the transaction should alter or affect the necessary
requirement for an acquiree fairness opinion or financial analysis.
The Delaware courts have also never examined within the overall
takeover regime, or otherwise, the why or when of their virtual
requirement for a fairness opinion and actual requirement of an
underlying valuation. The courts have simply stated that this is an
246
obligation in satisfaction of the duty of care. This is a failing: the
analyses or fairness opinion are simply a means to inform an acquiree
board as to whether a price offered is within an appropriate range of
247
values. However, as briefly noted supra at Part II.C, an appropriate
price, upon a board- or stockholder-initiated decision to sell, is one
248
set by the effective market. Absent other factors, the resulting price
246. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985).
247. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
248. The academic and judicial communities are generally in agreement that in a
perfect market this is the correct conclusion for not only price but as a fundamental
guidepost for structuring a legal takeover regime. See Allen, supra note 106, at 561-62
(discussing the effect of market prices on the takeover code structure); see also
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383 (1970) (outlining the various forms of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (examining the underlying reasons for the
efficient capital markets hypothesis and its consequences for the legal system).
However, this harmony disappears if the market or derived price is perceived as
either imperfect or inefficient. In this regard, there is no consensus as to whether
and when the market is efficient and its implication for value and price. In addition,
in circumstances where the market is possibly inefficient, there is no consensus
concerning the extent to which market-based mechanisms can and should suffice as
a true indicator of price within a legal takeover regime. See ROBERT SHILLER,
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 171-90 (2001) (arguing against the efficient markets
hypothesis due to numerous contrary indicators); Daniel R. Fischel, Market Evidence
in Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 941, 942-49 (2002) (discussing the debate and
arguing that market-based prices are the superior method of valuation and price
determination). I think it is fair to say that the answer lies somewhere in the middle,
which is that market-based prices are the truest indicator of value. But see RapidAmerican Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992) (“Recent price changes in
the stock market dramatically illustrate the defects of an overstated reliance on market
price to determine a corporation’s intrinsic value in an appraisal proceeding.”)
(citing Application of Del. Racing Ass’n, 213 A.2d 203, 211 (Del. 1965)). However,
for purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to wade into the deeper debate
concerning how efficient the market is and its implications for a takeover code.
Rather, once a corporation makes a decision to sell, the only question should be the
appropriate legal and procedural mechanisms necessary to achieve the highest price
reasonably available. See infra note 249 (discussing this standard and dovetailing it
with what is a “fair” price). The aim of any takeover code should be to encourage
such resultant prices, and I would argue that an auction-based process is the most
effective mechanism to produce such a price. However, where an effective marketbased price is not possible due to market failures, such as in going-private
transactions, or market inefficiencies price may be achieved or validated through
other means. The underlying question is then the level of court supervision or legal
regulation necessary to ensure that the non-market-based price is one that is “fair.”
Relatedly, there is also the question of how ineffective the market must be before
non-market-based measures are introduced, and a consequent assessment in such
cases of the trade-off between monitoring and regulation and a less market-based
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arrived at through such a mechanism would be a fair one to the
249
The Delaware courts have never truly
acquiree’s stockholders.
recognized this in their takeover jurisprudence, particularly in the
250
fairness opinion context.
In fact, they have never acknowledged
any definition of fairness for purposes of a fairness opinion. Instead,
fairness opinions in the Delaware takeover regime have been
endowed with independent worth and significance. This results in
needless redundancy. It does not recognize that the opinion
mandate is inherently circular—a fairness opinion opines to a result
if a process were followed, yet at the same time is required even if the
process is so adhered to.
This is important. The Delaware courts have set up a system that
virtually requires an acquiree board of directors in a corporate
control situation to obtain these opinions in order to satisfy the
board’s duty of care. Yet, in doing so, the Delaware courts have
assumed that these opinions can definitively validate a given
251
negotiated price.
In fact, under Delaware law a board relying in
good faith upon a fairness opinion to determine price is protected
252
from liability on this matter. This all provides too much weight to
the fairness opinion. Instead, it should be recognized for what it is: a
substitute and simply one factor to be used in setting price.
An explanation for this may be the cleverness of the Delaware
courts. Having erected a takeover system that is not purely marketbased, retention of the fairness opinion serves as a check; it affirms
price. Compare McGinty, supra note 89 (arguing for adoption of a mandatory auction
process under Delaware law in order to maximize stockholder value in all corporate
control transactions), with Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and
Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21 (1982) (concluding that “[t]he
available data support a no-auction rule, and the possibility of diversification all but
ensures that investors prefer to maximize the gains from the monitoring and
takeover process rather than to maximize the price a given target may fetch in an
auction”). Finally, all of this concerns a “fair” price for an acquiree—the calculus for
an acquirer is wholly different as a market price may not be the appropriate one due
to bidder irrationality, possible overpayment and information asymmetry. See
generally Black, supra note 165, at 623-34. Caveat emptor.
249. Fair is a relative concept, but here a fair “price” can be defined as the highest
price reasonably available. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. This is the
standard set forth in Delaware for a corporate board when it initiates a change of
control or break-up of the corporation. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
250. In fact, the courts have readily acknowledged the opposite, justifying their
approach due to market inefficiencies and irregularities and ostensible protection of
unaffiliated stockholders. See, e.g., Rapid-American Corp., 603 A.2d at 806; William T.
Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 (2002); Strine, supra note 245.
251. See supra Part III.C.1.
252. There is an ostensible requirement of reasonable reliance here, but the
courts have rarely scrutinized this element. See supra note 223 (discussing this
failure).
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that the ultimate paid price is within a range of values that would
otherwise have been paid had the system been so situated.
Alternatively, a fairness opinion confirms that a range of values is
appropriate for a transaction agreed upon in an imperfectlyconducted auction or other market-based mechanism. In this role,
the fairness opinion can act as a cure for an otherwise deficient sale
process. Yet, this has never been enunciated, and the Delaware
courts have not defined “fairness” to encompass this idea. These
explanations also assume that fairness opinions and their underlying
analyses can provide reliable value ranges. Even if reliable valuation
253
is possible—and I believe it is —the better approach would arguably
be to establish a takeover regime which produces a market-based
price, the true price, rather than a per se procedural requirement for
an imperfect substitute.
D. The Academic Response
The legal academic community has cast a limited gaze upon the
fairness opinion, and only a handful of articles and notes have been
written on the topic. The majority of these pieces were published in
the ten-year period following Van Gorkom and focused on the nature
and scope of an investment bank’s liability for rendering a fairness
254
opinion.
However, there have been three significant law review
articles that went beyond the liability prism; addressing the scope,
role, and need of fairness opinions within the skein of Delaware
takeover jurisprudence.
In an article published in 1989, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They
255
and What Can be Done About It?, the authors, Professors Lucian Arye
Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, criticized fairness opinion practice for
two existent, fundamental faults. First, Professors Bebchuk and
Kahan cited investment banker discretion inherent in the
256
preparation of these opinions.
The authors segmented this into
“definitional” and “measurement” problems. The “definitional”
problem posited by the authors was the lack of any meaningful
257
explanation in these opinions as to what constituted a fair price.
The “measurement problem” constituted embedded subjectivity in
258
the valuation techniques underlying fairness opinions. Second, the
253. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text (discussing studies supporting
the utility of valuation).
254. See supra note 38 for citation of these articles.
255. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10.
256. Id. at 29-37.
257. Id. at 30-34.
258. Id. at 34-37.
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authors asserted that the investment banks rendering these opinions
were conflicted due to, among other reasons, their incentive-based
fee structure and desire to maintain and initiate future client
259
relationships.
The remedy proposed by the authors for these perceived defects
was a judicial one keyed to each of the two faults. First, Professors
Bebchuk and Kahan recommended that courts should put forth
definitions of fairness and determine the appropriate parameters and
260
The authors briefly suggested possible
circumstances for each.
definitions for fairness in various types of corporate control
transactions, but they did not explicate further on this point, stating
261
that this was better left to the courts. Investment banks would then
utilize these judicially-enunciated standards to define fairness in
262
fairness opinions. Fairness opinions that did not so define fairness
263
would be disregarded by the courts.
Second, Professors Bebchuk and Kahan recommended that the
courts mitigate the “measurement problem” by “weigh[ing] an
opinion depending on whether it states a range of fair prices and on
264
the extent to which its conclusion is sensitive to its assumptions.”
The authors argued that this would reduce subjectivity by conveying
265
More
more information and limiting investment bank discretion.
specifically, this would engender more exacting valuations since the
specification of a range and the conduct of a sensitivity analysis would
shine sunlight upon the investment banks’ valuation practices, and
subject investment banks to the risk of reputational loss for rendering
266
unreasonable opinions.
This would restrict investment bank
discretion in the preparation of fairness opinions since it would
267
“become harder for them to make bad deals look good.”
The
authors, however, stated that theirs was an imperfect fix, and
investment banks would still maintain discretion at an uncertain level,
which could permit manipulation. However, no other reforms in this
268
arena were proposed.
Professors Bebchuk and Kahan then advocated for courts to
discount fairness opinions rendered by investment banks whose fees
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 37-43.
Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 46-49.
Id. at 46-47.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 47.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 49.
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were in any measure contingent upon the success of the related
269
However, the authors recognized a difficulty in this
transaction.
270
approach for dealing with this perceived investment bank conflict.
The rendering of a fairness opinion in many corporate control
transactions is ancillary to the core service of general transaction
271
advice.
The authors’ proposal would eliminate the ability of
investment banks to charge their normal contingency fee for this
272
general advice.
The authors recognized that this would be
273
Accordingly, the authors proposed that in such
impractical.
situations a second investment bank be retained to render the
274
fairness opinion. The authors argued that this would reduce, if not
275
This would obviously create additional
eliminate, the conflict.
transaction costs, but Professors Bebchuk and Kahan were not
troubled, as these costs would be “trivial in relation to the amounts
276
involved in a transaction as a whole.”
Professors Bebchuk and Kahan then argued that although their
proposed remedies provided meaning and a role for fairness
opinions the courts must nevertheless recognize the limited nature of
277
fairness opinions.
The authors stated that “as long as excessive
judicial reliance on fairness opinions is avoided, such opinions do
278
Other than this
have the potential for serving a useful function.”
statement, the authors did not discuss Van Gorkom’s requirements, the
future contours of judicial reliance on fairness opinions, or the exact
going-forward role for the fairness opinion.
The two other articles, published in 1992, had different focuses
and placed a far more skeptical eye on the fairness opinion. The first
was Charles M. Elson’s Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or Should We
279
Care?
The second was William J. Carney’s Fairness Opinions: How
280
Fair Are They And Why We Should Do Nothing About It. They each had
sound-bite worthy titles but advocated different roles for the fairness
opinion while repudiating Delaware’s per se fairness opinion
requirement.

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 49-50.
Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 49.
Id.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 50-51.
Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 51.
Id. at 51-53.
Id. at 52-53.
Elson, Are They Fair, supra note 10.
Carney, supra note 10.
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Professor Elson’s article highlighted the subjectivity in the
valuation calculations underlying a fairness opinion and the
consequent problem of reliance. Professor Elson traced through
each of the valuation techniques underlying a fairness opinion and
281
briefly noted the discretion inherent.
He then explored the
perceived conflicts in fairness opinion analyses and the potential for
282
manipulation that this could engender. He wrote that given these
problems, “truly objective and independent valuation advice is, as a
283
practical matter, difficult to achieve.”
Confronting these issues, Professor Elson threw up his hands. The
subjectivity and conflict issues made the fairness opinion, in his
colorful words, “as necessary to valuation analysis as is the appendix
to the human digestive system . . . . [and] [o]ther than producing
profits for the investment banking industry, it produces no benefit
284
for the shareholders.” Professor Elson asserted that the market was
the true and correct arbiter of price, and the fairness opinion was an
285
unnecessary and valueless substitute. He argued that the Delaware
courts should therefore repudiate Van Gorkom’s financial analysis
286
requirement. However, Professor Elson, despite his dim view on its
287
worth, was not ready to discard the fairness opinion altogether.
Fairness opinions would still be sought and received, since these
288
opinions were, in his belief, a cheap substitute for insurance. This
is because the fairness opinion in a corporate control transaction
established needed liability protection for directors under title 8,
289
section 141(e) of the Delaware Code.
Fairness opinions would
therefore provide boards necessary latitude in corporate control
transactions by bestowing protections equivalent of the business
290
judgment rule to their actions.
281. Elson, Are They Fair, supra note 10, at 961-65.
282. Id. at 965-70.
283. Id. at 970. Professor Elson also surveyed the grounds for investment banker
liability for rendering an incorrect fairness opinion. Id. at 970-95. He concluded
that imposing negligence liability on investment bankers for inaccurate fairness
opinions was economically ineffectual and counter-productive. Id. at 995-1000.
284. Id. at 1002.
285. Id. at 1000-03.
286. Id. at 1002.
287. Id. at 1002-03.
288. Id.
289. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001).
290. Elson, Are They Fair, supra note 10, at 1002-03. Professor Elson later coauthored an article on fairness opinions wherein he appears to have revised his views
and adopted a differing position with respect to fairness opinions. Elson, Can They Be
Made Useful?, supra note 6. In this brief article, Professor Elson appears to have
changed his opinion that fairness opinions are of little use: the authors state that
“we believe that properly priced fairness opinions can fulfill the function for which
they were intended.” Id. at 5. The authors, however, propose two reforms be
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Professor Carney adopted a viewpoint similar to Professor Elson’s
with respect to the fairness opinion. In his article, Professor Carney
argued that the fairness opinion is a poor, formalistic substitute for
the market and reliance on these opinions ignores how price is set in
291
the market. Furthermore, Professor Carney asserted that a fairness
opinion delivered to an acquiree in a corporate control transaction
292
can never determinatively ascertain price, fair or otherwise.
The
reasoning behind this statement is that, absent inside information, an
investment bank cannot predict the mindset and situation of the
acquirer and therefore the ultimate price that it would be willing to
293
pay.
Accordingly, investment banks in such a situation can never
294
specify a single price but can only provide a range of values.
295
Professor Carney found such a range to be of little use.
Consequently, Professor Carney stated that fairness opinions are a
296
“costly legal tax that legal rules impose on business transactions.”
He posited that they “exist for two reasons; a judicial belief in the
determinacy of value, and legal rules that shelter the business
judgment of a board when based on reliance on the opinions of
297
experts.”
Rejecting the first rationale, he argued that insurance
would be cheaper than the formal requirement of a fairness opinion
298
he endowed with little, if any, worth. Ultimately, Professor Carney
viewed the market as the gatekeeper, concluding that Van Gorkom
should be overturned and that fairness opinions should be discarded
299
as an inappropriate transaction cost. The informational aspect and
protection for stockholders, if any, provided by the fairness opinion
would be better expressed for the acquiree in the corporate control
transaction through stockholder decisions to sell based on market
forces and, in minority take-outs and other situations where
implemented in order to transform fairness opinions into more useful tools. First,
the authors address investment banking conflicts. They argue that boards should
“consider having the fairness opinion rendered by an investment bank other than
the one receiving the success fee.” Id. Second, the authors address the issue of
subjective valuation. They propose “standards to guide investment banks in their
due diligence and pricing of transactions requiring fairness opinions.” Id.
291. Carney, supra note 10, at 537-40.
292. Id. at 533-35.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 534.
295. Id. at 534-35. Professor Carney also discussed setting liability rules for the
rendering of fairness opinions. He rejected setting such standards, since he believed
that courts would be unable to craft minimum standards of care due to the
inherently subjective nature of the valuation exercise and consequent increased
costs. Id. at 537.
296. Carney, supra note 10, at 528.
297. Id. at 525.
298. Id. at 528.
299. Id. at 538.
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stockholder choice was not an effective check, through independent
300
directors, appraisal remedies, and the courts.
IV. REFORM OF THE FAIRNESS OPINION
This lands us at today. Fairness opinion practices remain virtually
unchanged since the sea shift engendered by Van Gorkom. Since Van
Gorkom, the Delaware courts have consistently encouraged, if not
ostensibly required, these opinions in corporate control transactions.
The result is continued doctrinal incoherence and redundancy in the
Delaware takeover regime. An instrument of questionable utility is
per se required when market-based mechanisms would be better
suited and more effective tools to inform board and stockholder
decisions in corporate control transactions. The SEC and NASD have
also promulgated or proposed limited disclosure requirements with
respect to fairness opinions rendered in corporate control
301
transactions.
Yet, these disclosure requirements do not effectively
address the current deficiencies in the fairness opinion regime. This
Part outlines my proposals for economic and beneficial reform of the
fairness opinion.
A. The Fairness Opinion’s Necessity
Given the criticism levied against the fairness opinion, intellectual
and academic honesty requires that the merits and necessity of the
fairness opinion be explored before proposing reform. Professors
302
Elson and Carney prefer to discard the fairness opinion. They view
it as an imperfect market substitute that at best serves as a species of
303
board insurance.
Professors Bebchuk and Kahan do not address
the issue in any substantive manner. They assert that one should
avoid excessive judicial reliance on these opinions, but they assume
the utility of the fairness opinion and propose reforms to endow it
304
with greater meaning.
So, what to do? First, one should not lose sight of the ultimate goal
of a corporate control transaction. From the acquiree stockholders’
perspective, the goal is receipt of the highest price reasonably
305
available. Both Professor Elson and Professor Carney correctly note
300. Id. at 533-36.
301. See supra Parts III.A & III.B.
302. See supra notes 284-99 and accompanying text.
303. Id. Professor Elson later argued for the adoption of standards in the
preparation of fairness opinions. See supra note 290.
304. See supra notes 255-278 and accompanying text.
305. This is the standard under Delaware law when a board initiates a sale of
corporate control. Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
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that only the market can obtain such a price with certainty. Upon a
stockholder or board decision to sell, the highest price reasonably
available can be set through an effective market-based mechanism,
such as an open, informed, and inclusionary auction process with
limited or no exogenous burdens and equal bidder information on
307
There are other similar formulations, but if the
the acquiree.
corporate control transaction price is set in the foregoing manner or
as close thereto as possible, a fairness opinion or a financial analysis
for the acquiree board to satisfy its duty of care is unnecessary. This
is Van Gorkom’s downfall and Delaware courts should recognize it as
such. More specifically, the Delaware courts should acknowledge that
a fairness opinion, or underlying financial analysis, is only a substitute
for an effective market-based process to determine a “fair” price. Van
Gorkom’s holding should be overturned and a fairness opinion or
financial analysis should not be required when price is determined
308
through such means.
This does not slam the door on the fairness opinion for duty of
care purposes. A price in a corporate control transaction cannot
always be set through such a market-based process. For example, the
posture of the transaction may not permit it. This occurs in goingprivate transactions when the acquirer has informational or other
process-based advantages or can otherwise block interested acquirers
309
through a substantial shareholding. Practical barriers may also bar
182 (Del. 1986).
306. See supra notes 285, 291 and accompanying text.
307. Of course this formulation is an impossibility to achieve in practice.
However, the closer to this marker that one comes, the “truer” the market-based
price. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers:
A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); R. Preston McAfee & John
McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 699 (1987).
308. Instead, I would argue that the Delaware courts should focus on creating a
takeover scheme that encourages and produces such effective market-based results.
More specifically, there should be a legal prohibition on takeover defenses and deal
protection devices in order to facilitate a market-based takeover regime and produce
“purer” market-based prices albeit with concomitant protections against coercive and
other abusive practices as well as takeover rules that address information asymmetry
and other unavoidable market inefficiencies. The discussion of the application of my
proposal’s implications and conclusions beyond fairness opinions is well outside the
scope of this Article. See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 878-79 (1981)
(proposing the adoption of a tender offer rule prohibiting acquirees from taking any
action that “could interfere with the success of the offer or result in the shareholders
of the [acquiree] being denied the opportunity to tender their shares”).
309. See, e.g., Crescent/Mach I Partners, 846 A.2d 963, 986 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(holding that the board was not required under Delaware law to auction the
corporation where the majority stockholder owning 61.5% of the corporation could
have thwarted such effort); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del.
1987) (holding that the board was not required under Delaware law to auction the
corporation where the majority stockholder owning sixty-five percent of the
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implementation of effective market-based processes. A market-based
mechanism such as an auction can be disruptive to the business of a
corporation, creating uncertainty with customers, suppliers, and
310
employees.
Alternatively, corporations may not have time to
conduct an auction process due to their own corporate difficulties.
These two situations are noteworthy because Delaware law allows
corporations to avoid these difficulties by choosing to be acquired
outside of an auction process subject to a post-agreement market311
check. Thereafter, an auction may develop, but it will be inhibited,
though not prevented, by deal protection devices such as break-up
312
fees and non-solicits.
Thus, in each of these two circumstances,
price is still set in an imperfect, albeit judicially-permitted, market.
The fairness opinion can function as a useful check and
informational tool in these situations, informing the acquiree board
as to the value of the corporation when a market-based mechanism is
not available. However, even here, the fairness opinion has inherent
limitations. The underlying financial analyses cannot ascertain or
predict price. They cannot set price since they can only provide a
range of values that the fairness opinion can opine to as fair, utilizing
313
a presumed definition of fairness.
Additionally, given that the
acquirer’s mindset and information are not available to the acquiree
or to the investment bank, a fairness opinion cannot forecast the
price an acquirer would ultimately be willing to offer, over and above
314
the intrinsic value of the corporation to its current stockholders.
However, financial analyses can calculate a base value range of the
acquiree’s worth. This range can then be compared to premiums
paid in comparable acquisitions to arrive at a takeover base price
corporation could have thwarted such effort).
310. See, e.g., In re MONY Group Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 852 A.2d 9, 21 (Del.
Ch. 2004) (holding that the board’s decision against initiating an auction was
reasonable in light of its judgment that an auction would jeopardize the
corporation’s workforce and allow competitors to benefit).
311. See supra note 67 for a discussion of the contours of a market check under
Delaware law.
312. See, e.g., In re MONY Group, 852 A.2d at 24 (permitting a post-agreement
market check with a non-solicit clause and a termination fee that amounted to 3.3%
of the acquired corporation’s equity value and 2.4% of the total transaction value);
In re Pennaco Energy, 787 A.2d 691, 707 (Del. Ch. 2001) (permitting a postagreement market check with a non-solicit clause and a termination fee that
amounted to three percent of the acquired corporation’s equity value).
313. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of
valuation with respect to predicting and setting price).
314. This is primarily due to the frequent behavioral irrationality of acquirers and
the problem of asymmetrical information. See supra note 165. See generally SCHILLER,
supra note 248 (discussing aspects of investor irrationality and its effect on markets);
ANDREI SCHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
(2000) (describing various theories of behavioral finance and investor behavior).
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range—a minimum auction price. The resultant opinion has worth
since it can inform the board in an imperfect market situation that a
given price is fair on a base case level or by any other measure that
315
defines fairness.
However, even in these circumstances, fairness
opinions and financial analyses are not a talismanic cure-all. Their
imperfections make them only one element in the total mix of
information that an acquiree board should consider when deciding
to engage in a corporate control transaction.
Therefore, the Delaware courts should place value on these
opinions to determine if a board has satisfied its duty of care in
paradigms where an effective market-based price cannot be or is not
316
obtained.
So, for example, a fairness opinion or financial analysis
would neither be required nor considered relevant in the duty of care
analysis if the process followed by the acquiree board was correctly
structured to produce a market price. In transactions where such a
process was not or could not be followed, a fairness opinion or
financial analysis would be only one factor to be considered along
with the process actually followed and the price actually produced
relevant to the market. The fairness opinion or financial analysis
delivered in this context would be an indicator, but not a
317
presumptive one, that the board satisfied its duty of care.
Here, one must consider whether the fairness opinion or the
underlying financial analysis is more appropriate, as they are
functional equivalents. However, the fairness opinion is the better
form because it distills the underlying analysis, permitting
inexperienced directors and stockholders to point to an easily
comprehensible statement that a transaction is fair, rather than a
315. See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., A ‘Fairness Letter’ is Just an Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
1986, at Section 3, 2 (arguing that fairness opinions serve an important purpose by
informing directors of value).
316. The investment bank as a corporate control financial advisor to acquirees
would not disappear under my proposals. Investment banks provide four principal
services to acquirees in corporate control transactions: first, as a broker, finding and
introducing companies that may be interested in corporate control transactions;
second, advising on corporate control transaction processes and structure; third,
advising on consideration by assessing stock consideration and recommending
consideration types; and fourth, rendering a fairness opinion and providing financial
valuation advice. Under my proposals, there is no change to the investment bank’s
first three roles. In addition, investment banks would still be retained for financial
advice, including the initial decision to sell, even if they do not render a fairness
opinion.
317. The argument that boards would nonetheless seek and obtain fairness
opinions because they shield companies from liability or serve as a form of insurance
is discussed infra at Part IV.C. In addition, this proposal would preserve, albeit to a
diminished extent, the investment bank’s role as a gatekeeper in corporate control
transactions. See also Fiflis, supra note 35, at 513-15 (arguing for investment banks as
gatekeepers in providing fairness opinions).
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thirty-page board book. In any event, I would argue that financial
analyses that do not find a numerical range of fairness are deficient
since they do not properly inform their recipients of the analyses’
318
actual meaning. So, the fairness opinion remains the lightning rod
in my proposals and should survive as the focused instrument
typically delivered to a board in the circumstances previously
described.
Now I diverge from the opinions of Professor Elson and Professor
Carney. Both view the market as the arbiter, even in marketimperfect situations; for them, the fairness opinion or underlying
financial analysis has nothing to legally add except as a form of
319
insurance.
I disagree. I do so because I make two critical
assumptions about fairness opinions. First, financial analyses can
320
inform as to value.
Second, the perceived and actual conflicts of
investment banks are not impediments to rendering worthwhile
321
fairness opinions.
However, if the fairness opinion is to have a
useful role, it must be subject to reform. In the next section, I discuss
these proposals for improvement.
B. The Fairness Opinion’s Regulation
1. Guidelines and standards
If fairness opinions are to have meaning, the opinion itself and the
underlying financial analysis must be prepared in accordance with
issued guidelines and standards and subject to supervision by a quasipublic body, an Investment Banking Authority (the “IBA”). The IBA,
a guideline and standard-setting body, would serve three purposes
with respect to fairness opinions and valuation practice. First, the
IBA would reduce subjectivity and investment banking discretion by
promulgating guidelines and standards for valuation practice.
Second, by serving as a corridor between academia and industry, the
IBA would ensure that guidelines and standards are kept up-to-date
and best practices are adhered to. Finally, the IBA would supervise
fairness opinion preparation procedures, investment bank internal

318. This is arguably the case under Delaware law. See Sutton Holding Corp. v.
DeSoto, Inc., Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990 WL 13476, at *8 (Del. Ch. 1990) (holding that
the failure of the board to obtain or receive a fairness opinion with a fair value range
was unreasonable in light of the unsolicited acquirer’s willingness to consider raising
its offering price).
319. Carney, supra note 10, at 528. See generally Elson, Can They Be Made Useful?,
supra note 6.
320. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
321. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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approval and vetting processes, due diligence requirements, conflicts,
322
The IBA
and other matters appurtenant to fairness opinions.
would also be an interactive body that industry practitioners could
323
consult for guidance on issues as they arise.
I envision that this
body would ultimately work on issues much broader than fairness
opinions, that is, all aspects of corporate investment banking. This
324
wider supervision is, I think, sorely needed.
The IBA would not promulgate a strict statutory equivalent code
that would step-by-step direct valuation practice. This is neither
desirable nor possible.
Rather, the IBA would issue general
guidelines and standards for valuation practices akin to the current
practice of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”)
325
in the accounting industry.
These guidelines would outline
acceptable valuation methodologies and procedures. The IBA would
also set standards and a designated course to follow to solve
disagreements on valuation techniques.
In addition, specific
requirements would be mandated by the IBA where necessary in
order to prudently reduce subjective decision-making to the greatest
extent feasible. These guidelines and standards would go much
farther than the limited requirements that Professors Bebchuk and
326
Kahan propose.
While the IBA would chart its own course, I
envision that the guidelines and standards would encompass the
following minimum requirements:
322. See also Elson, Can They Be Made Useful?, supra note 6, at 5 (proposing the
adoption of standards governing fairness opinion preparation); Investment Banker
Liability: A Panel Discussion, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 557, 601-02 (1991) (panel discussion
covering the scope of a possible code of professional conduct for fairness opinion
practice).
323. The U.K. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers in the United Kingdom (the
“Panel”) functions in this matter. Practitioners can go before the executive office of
the Panel and ask about the possible effects of the U.K. takeover regime on future
transactions. The Takeover Panel Home Page, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.
uk/new/. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”) has a similar
system to permit technical inquiries. FASB Home Page, http://www.fasb.org/
inquiry/.
324. I believe this due to the many conflicting and possibly negligent practices of
investment banks that have come to light in the post-Enron/Worldcom world. See
Issac Lustgarten & Jonathan C. Stapleton, Corporate Governance Reform and Financial
Institution Intermediaries, 18 No. 2 Insights 4 (Feb. 2004) (outlining postEnron/Worldcom SEC enforcement actions and civil suits against investment banks
with respect to corporate scandals and conflicts); Hillary A. Sale, Banks:
The
Forgotten(?) Partners in Fraud, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 139, 144-54 (2004) (outlining
investment banks’ roles in the Enron fraud). Of course, whether this regulation
should come from the SEC, NASD, or an IBA is debatable. However, an IBA would
be able to provide directed, specific oversight and regulation of investment banks in
a manner that a broader regulatory agency may not be able or desire to do.
325. For a description of the nature and role of the FASB, see Facts About FASB,
http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml#mission.
326. See generally supra notes 264-278 and accompanying text.

DAVIDOFF_PRINTER

2006]

8/12/2006 2:13:10 PM

FAIRNESS OPINIONS

1617

Valuation Techniques. The IBA would establish guidelines and
examples for appropriate and preferred valuation techniques for use
in different valuation contexts.
Valuation Inputs. Where possible, the IBA would issue guidance or
strict directives on the selection of valuation inputs.
The
implementation of set standards should be possible in many areas of
valuation such as the appropriate methodology for calculation of a
327
discount rate, as well as the risk-free rate and market-risk rate.
Valuation Weight. The IBA would put forth guidance on the weight
to be provided to different techniques in evaluating fairness.
Valuation Disclosure. The IBA would issue disclosure standards for
fairness opinions, their underlying financial analyses, and potential
conflicts. This would include requirements as to disclosure of
compensation and indemnification arrangements. These standards
would mandate that disclosure be numerically meaningful and
prohibit boiler-plate or cursory responses.
Valuation Preparation. Procedural requirements would be set forth
by the IBA for the preparation of fairness opinions and underlying
valuation. This would include minimal requirements for investment
bank fairness opinion internal review and approval procedures.
Valuation Due Diligence. The IBA would establish minimum
standards concerning the scope of investment bank review of
corporate information in the preparation of a fairness opinion.
Fairness Opinion Form. The IBA would issue standards for the
fairness opinion form. This would encompass acceptable and
impermissible disclaimers and qualifications that could be made in
the fairness opinion itself.
Fairness Opinion Definition. Fairness opinions must do more than
just state they are fair. Fairness should be defined and given context
in the issuing letter. Accordingly, the IBA would issue guidelines
mandating this and setting forth model definitions for use in variant
corporate control transactions.
The IBA would not be a government-controlled body within the
SEC or another government agency, but would be a constituency328
based, quasi-public organization akin to the FASB.
I believe that
this distance would increase industry buy-in to the IBA while

327. See generally Campbell, supra note 70, at 45-47 (discussing possible valuation
inputs wherein governing rules could be appropriate).
328. I believe that it would be better to have a stand-alone, newly-formed IBA than
to form a branch or division of another existing entity such as the NASD. I believe
that this will bring focus to the organization and permit it to build an internal code
of conduct free from pre-conceived institutional biases.
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329

achieving a similar purpose. The officers and directors of the IBA
could be appointed by a board of trustees, itself appointed by public
organizations with an interest in its operation. This is the current
330
structure of the FASB, and it would inhibit possible industry
capture of the IBA. To further encourage industry buy-in, the IBA
would not initially have the ability to impose fines or other penalties.
However, implementation of the IBA’s directives would come by
court fiat. Fairness opinions that were not prepared according to IBA
guidelines and standards would be disregarded by the courts. In
addition, the IBA would set an industry benchmark, which
331
investment banks would ignore at their peril.
I realize that the investment banks would fight this proposal tooth
and nail, but I believe that the IBA would actually benefit the
industry. The value of a fairness opinion would increase, and
perhaps make them even more sought after, particularly by acquirers,
332
for their informational, screening, and signaling benefits. The IBA
would also make fairness opinion and valuation practices easier by
standardizing the process. Finally, the IBA would provide crystal
guidelines and standards to assess appropriate investment banking
practices and potential liability in the rendition of fairness opinions.
This is an improvement on today’s regime where liability is uncertain
and litigation exposure unknown due to the lack of common
guideposts for proper fairness opinion practice and valuation
333
technique.
Alternatively, if the investment banking community
does not act, the deep flaws in current fairness opinion practice may
ultimately lead to scandal and reform in a measure and content that
the investment banks cannot control and may not desire. Acting
beforehand upon this or similar proposals would permit investment
banking industry participation and a say in any reform.
329. This has been true of both the FASB and the Panel, which both succeeded as
regulators while remaining quasi-public organizations.
330. Facts About FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts/index. shtml#mission.
331. This would occur because courts would presumably look to IBA standards as
a touchstone to determine investment bank liability in connection with the
rendering of fairness opinions.
332. For two recent interesting and informative empirical studies of fairness
opinions and these potential benefits, see Helen M. Bowers & William R. Latham III,
Information Asymmetry, litigation risk, uncertainty and the demand for fairness opinions:
Evidence from U.S. mergers and acquisitions, 1980-2002 (Apr. 13, 2006), available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=626321 (finding that the probability of a
corporation obtaining a fairness opinion is increased by asymmetric information,
litigation risk and other transactions uncertainty measures), and Kisgen et al., supra
note 12 (finding fairness opinions are more common in transactions where
uncertainty and legal risk are high).
333. See Rubenstein, supra note 38, at 1729 (noting that “[t]he only existing
regulation [of fairness opinions] is based on the imposition of negligence liability”).
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The costs of the IBA would be borne by the investment banking
industry through a mandatory membership fee or other industrybased contribution mechanism. The increased costs should be
substantially outweighed by the greater utility and predictability of
fairness opinions and valuation practices and more certain liability
standards. I believe that this would be true even if fairness opinions
are not as frequently requested and are relied upon less frequently by
the courts.
The IBA and its issued guidelines and standards would not
eliminate all subjectivity from fairness opinions and financial
analyses. However, they would create a regime of more uniform,
predictable, and improved valuation and related investment banking
practices. Subjectivity would also be limited by the ability of outside
parties to better compare and deconstruct valuations. This and other
improvements engendered by the IBA would increase the utility and
reliability of the fairness opinion and its underlying valuation.
Fairness opinions would more fully inform as to value in corporate
control transactions, permitting more confident reliance upon them
for determining the fairness of an offered price as well as
informational, signaling, screening and other purposes.
2. Disclosure
Disclosure requirements for fairness opinions and financial
analyses in corporate control transactions should mandate disclosure
of all material points in any valuation underlying a fairness opinion.
This would ensure that opining investment banks adhere to any
guidelines and standards set by the IBA. I define material for these
purposes to include any subjective decision-point that could
materially influence valuation. A disclosure obligation keyed to this
standard would highlight its beneficial effects on the subjective inputs
in any valuation. This would also place underlying financial analyses
under greater outside scrutiny, thereby inhibiting subjectivity and use
of out-dated or incorrect practices. Accordingly, the argument for
this heightened disclosure becomes stronger if my IBA proposal is
not adopted.
The disclosure regulation for fairness opinions promulgated by the
SEC, NASD, and the Delaware courts, and that recommended by
Professors Bebchuk and Kahan is accordingly insufficient in that it
334
does not require disclosure at this level.
The SEC, the primary
334. See supra at Parts III.A & III.B for a discussion of the SEC and NASD
requirements, respectively.
Delaware has a judicially-promulgated disclosure
requirement of “a fair summary of the substantive work performed by the investment
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regulator in this area, should remedy this defect. In addition, the
SEC should fix the existing discrepancy with respect to cash tender
offers in its regulatory scheme by requiring this proposed disclosure
for acquirees in all public corporate control transactions where a
fairness opinion has been received and its existence is publicly
disclosed. To the extent that the SEC or the courts do not mandate
such disclosure, the IBA, if it comes into existence, should implement
such requirements.
I justify this disclosure primarily as a check on investment banking
and board behavior, rather than for the utility of the information.
Retail stockholders are more likely to find meaning in market prices
and the headline number, rather than attempt to understand
valuation practices. In addition, sophisticated investors tend to
conduct their own analysis. Here, disclosure of these inputs will aid
their work, even if it is unlikely to change their investment decision.
However, if investment banks are required to disclose these points,
they will be presumably more careful and deliberate in their choices
and, hopefully, boards, knowing this information will be disclosed,
would probe it to a greater extent than they currently do. This would
ultimately benefit stockholders by increasing the quality of
information available to board decision makers, thereby facilitating
more informed board choices to enter into corporate control
transactions. Again, this is an increased need in the absence of an
IBA and guidelines and standards.
3. Conflicts
There have been a number of proposed solutions to the issue
outlined supra at Part II.C with respect to investment bank conflicts.
335
The NASD and SEC have adopted a disclosure-based approach.
Professors Bebchuk and Kahan argue that boards should obtain a
second fairness opinion from an independent bank that does not
have a stake in the success of the transaction other than a fee for the
336
Neither of these fully addresses the heart of the
fairness opinion.
bankers upon whose advice the recommendations of their board as to how to vote on
a merger or tender rely.” In re Pure Resources, 808 A.2d 421, 449 (Del. Ch. 2002).
The full parameters of this obligation have yet to be judicially outlined.
335. See supra at Parts III.A & III.B.
336. See generally Elson, Can They Be Made Useful?, supra note 6 (advocating for
“independent directors [to] consider having the fairness opinion rendered by an
investment bank other than the one receiving the success fee”); Mark J. Mihanovic,
Legal Perils Mount For M&A Advisers, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J., Nov. 1, 2005 (stating
that due to conflict and other issues “[t]here is good reason to believe that the trend
toward greater use of second fairness opinions will continue”); Joan Harrison,
Pitching Deals to Increasingly Skeptical Boards, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J., Aug. 1, 2005
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conflicts issues or the current problems with fairness opinion
practice.
Disclosure-based solutions only partially address the issue.
Certainly, this disclosure is worthy; boards and stockholders should
be aware of the potential conflicts that an investment bank may have.
This disclosure should be meaningful; boiler-plate disclosures should
be prohibited. It should include a requirement to disclose exact
compensation numbers for the fairness opinion itself and for other
337
“material relationships.”
It should also include a requirement to
disclose the exact details of any indemnification and liability-limiting
338
arrangements.
In addition, egregious practices, such as dual
representation, should be prohibited. However, the problem is not
that stockholders, directors, officers, and others do not know of these
339
conflicts. They are all too aware of them.
The problem is that
disclosure-based solutions do not address the ultimate issue with
these opinions; the search for meaning in an instrument that has
underlying subjectivity, a fluid and undefined conclusion of fairness
and that is not prepared according to best practices or any fixed set
of disclosed guidelines and standards. The conflicts issue is acute
only because of the ability of potentially-conflicted investment banks
to manipulate the process due to these failings. If the subjectivity and
best practices issues were addressed through the proposals made
herein, then the conflicts problem should be manageable, albeit with
recommended supervision by an IBA.
(noting that investment banks are “seeing more requests for dual fairness opinions”);
Ann Davis & Dennis K. Berman, Checkup Prompts Search for Second Opinions, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 24, 2005, at C-1 (outlining the increased tendency of boards to seek a second
fairness opinions). Interestingly, in connection with its consideration of the
regulation of going-private transactions, the SEC proposed requiring that two
independent advisors (presumably investment banks) evaluate the consideration
offered. This requirement was never adopted. See Notice of Public Fact-Finding
Investigation and Rulemaking Proceeding in the Matter of ‘Going-Private’
Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release No. 3411231 [1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Feb. 6, 1975).
337. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (highlighting the importance of
this disclosure).
338. See also Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 10, at 254 (proposing that
“[w]henever an advisor is rendering a fairness opinion under a waiver or
indemnification of duty of care liability, specific and conspicuous disclosure of the
waiver should . . . be presented to shareholders”).
339. This is illustrated in the new disclosure trend by acquirees to include,
purportedly at SEC staff request, a risk factor in their transaction documentation
concerning contingent compensation and past relationships with their investment
banks. See, e.g., Supervalu Registration Statement (Form S-4), at 22-23 (Apr. 28,
2006) (disclosing as a risk factor that “[s]ome of the financial advisors to [the
transaction participants] have had prior business relationships with one or more of
the parties to the transactions and are entitled to contingent fees in connection with
the transactions”).
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It is for these reasons that I believe the idea of a second investment
bank is misguided. While this double-down ameliorates the conflicts
issue at the high cost of a second opinion, it does not deal with what I
340
see as the real issues.
Ignoring this point for the moment, the
benefits of a second opinion are probably not worth the costs. An
investment bank is typically under pressure to arrive at the “right”
outcome for the board that retained it; a bank that regularly went
against its mandate would soon find itself with little business. So, in
circumstances where there is room for manipulation of the valuation,
with no guidelines or standards, and on the edge of fairness, the bias
will tend towards the “right” result—agreement with management—
no matter which bank is rendering the opinion, even if its purpose is
341
to render independent opinions.
In spite of these difficulties, the idea of creating separate
investment banks dedicated solely to rendering fairness opinions has
342
also been intermittently proposed.
However, this does not appear
to be the answer either. First, corporations generally require and
desire the general financial advice that investment banks provide. So,
again, as even Professors Bebchuk and Kahan recognize, two
investment banks would need to be retained, thereby alleviating the
343
Second,
conflict issue, but creating additional transaction costs.
investment banks that regularly refused to render fairness opinions
would soon find themselves with little business. I find no significant
purchase in the possible contrary argument that a market in quality
would develop whereby fairness opinions delivered by such banks
would be highly valued and sought after. My rationale is this: I see
no incentive or desire, legal or otherwise, in today’s market for this
development. There is also little value in creating such incentives
due to the high transaction costs of a second investment bank.
Again, this would be a misdirected solution.
Ultimately, though, it is only on the edges where these conflict
issues typically arise. Even in today’s fairness opinion regime, a bank
has substantial reputation and even liability risks that limit its ability
340. It can also be argued that the utilization of a second investment bank for a
fairness opinion deprives the corporation and its stockholders’ of the financial
advisor who understands the finances of the corporation and therefore is in a better
position to render an opinion as to fairness. I agree with this argument in the
presence of fairness opinion guidelines and standards.
341. See infra notes 344-346 and accompanying text for a discussion of investment
bank reputational incentives with respect to fairness opinion practices.
342. See Morgenson, supra note 149 (reporting on a newly formed investment
bank organized solely to render fairness opinions, but not provide financial advice,
in order to stem potential conflicts).
343. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10, at 49-51.
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to fudge a fairness opinion. These impetuses are reinforced by the
review procedures in place at each investment bank. They can be
further restricted through more exacting valuation practice and
fairness opinion procedures combined with heightened disclosure
standards implemented through the IBA.
A recent study by
Professors Charles W. Calomiris and Donna M. Hitscherich, provides
344
support for this position.
The authors analyzed fairness opinion
fees in friendly, cash tender offers from 1994-2002 and concluded
that there was no statistically significant difference in acquisition
premia when the fairness opinion fee was fixed rather than
345
contingent.
The authors therefore concluded that there was no
evidence that “investment banks are suborned by acquirers with
346
whom they have had a prior banking relationship.”
C. The Fairness Opinion’s Insurance Aspect
If fairness opinions are no longer a per se requirement under the
proposals set forth herein, it could be argued that they would still be
regularly sought and obtained by boards due to the inoculating effect
347
of title 8, section 141(e) of the Delaware Code.
This is the
insurance justification put forth by both Professor Elson and
348
Professor Carney.
However, as a practical matter under Delaware
law, this belief overlooks the effect of another provision of the
Delaware Code. Post-Van Gorkom, Delaware adopted title 8, section
349
102(b)(7),
which permits a Delaware corporation to, in its
certificate of incorporation, relieve its directors en toto from monetary
344. Charles W. Calomiris & Donna M. Hitscherich, Banker Fees and Acquisition
Premia for Targets in Cash Tender Offers: Challenges to the Popular Wisdom on Banker
Conflicts (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=708222.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 31. But see In re Tele-Communications, Inc., 2005 WL 3642727, at *10
(stating that “[a] contingently paid and possibly interested financial advisor might be
more convenient and cheaper absent a deal, but its potentially misguided
recommendations could result in even higher costs . . . .”); Kisgen et al., supra note
12, at 25 (empirical study finding that, in the case of acquirers, when the investment
bank advisor receives a contingent advisory fee acquirers have lower postannouncement period returns).
347. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (outlining the protections
afforded by a fairness opinion for purposes of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)).
348. See supra notes 288-300 and accompanying text.
349. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). This provision was adopted in the
wake of Van Gorkom to alleviate vocal concerns by corporations that their directors
would now be subject to increased liability exposure and that director’ insurance
premiums would consequently increase because of Van Gorkom’s holding. See Tamar
Lewin, Delaware Law Allows Less Director Liability, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1986, at D1; see
also Stephen A. Radin, Director Protection Statutes after Malpiede and Emerald Partners,
16 No. 2 INSIGHTS 10 (Feb. 2002) (discussing grounds and procedural mechanisms
for directors to assert a defense under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001)).
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350

liability for breach of their duty of care.
Almost every publicly
traded corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware
351
has opted into this provision. For directors of these corporations, a
fairness opinion and the cloak of title 8, section 141(e) do not
provide them any further substantive protection. Likewise, Professor
Elson and Professor Carney’s arguments that a fairness opinion
alleviates liability concern and establishes equivalent protections of
the business judgment rule do not have significant persuasion.
There is still some protection that a fairness opinion does provide
in cases where title 8, section 102(b)(7) is applicable. A fairness
opinion establishes a defense under title 8, section 141(e) from a suit
that seeks equitable relief premised upon a breach of the board’s
352
duty of care.
However, if the proposals put forth herein were
adopted, fairness opinions would not be required implicitly or
otherwise nor would they provide persuasive or definitive evidence of
satisfaction of either the duty of care or fairness itself. Depending
upon the circumstances of the corporate control transaction, they
would be only one factor to be considered, if at all, by the Delaware
courts.
A Delaware court considering whether to apply the
prophylactic protections of title 8, section 141(e) should therefore
adopt the same analysis. This would better comport with the true
nature and role a fairness opinion has in informing the board in a
corporate control transaction.
This leads to a cost-benefit component of this scrutiny, which is
applicable whether or not the proposals made herein are fully
353
implemented.
In all of these circumstances, the board should
assess the costs of the fairness opinion, the legal, informational and
350. See In re Ply Gem Indus., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 15779-NC, 2001 WL
755133, at *10 (Del. Ch. 2001) (stating that the exculpatory provision in certificate of
incorporation “authorized by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7), generally shields
directors from monetary liability for a breach of their duty of due care”).
351. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV.
477, 490 (2000) (finding that “[c]harter provision enabling statutes like Delaware’s
Del. Code tit. 8 section 102(b)(7), moreover, have been almost universally
implemented by corporations to which such laws apply”); see also Michael Bradley &
Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75
IOWA L. REV. 1, 62 (1989) (stating that of a sample of 593 public firms “it appears that
94% (559/593) of Delaware firms amended their articles of incorporation in
accordance with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 8, 102(b)(7)”).
352. See, e.g., Crescent/Mach I Partners v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 985 (Del. Ch.
2000) (rejecting the “allegation that the director defendants ‘breached their
fiduciary duties’ by approving an allegedly defective [fairness] opinion” on the basis
that it was barred by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)).
353. In this regard, it is interesting to note that one empirical study conducted
after Van Gorkom concluded that the value of Delaware firms fell significantly around
the time of the enactment of Del. Code tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). Bradley & Schipani, supra
note 351, at 74.
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other benefits that it can bestow, and the feasibility of other
alternative measures. In order to facilitate this choice, SEC or IBA
disclosure requirements should mandate that the amount of an
investment bank’s fee that is allocable to a fairness opinion, even if
contingent, should be separately disclosed from any other fees. This
will permit companies to assess the need for a fairness opinion and its
relative value and for stockholders to be able to critique this decision.
CONCLUSION
Fairness opinions are complicated beasts that are given high regard
by Delaware courts, and have a central, virtually mandatory role in
the corporate control transaction. This reliance is not currently
justified. Fairness opinions and underlying valuation practices are
problematic. They are prone to subjectivity and prepared by
investment banks that are conflicted and who do not follow optimal
valuation methodologies. Absent these issues, fairness opinions are
an imperfect substitute for a price engendered by an effective marketbased mechanism. Accordingly, fairness opinions in corporate
control transactions should not be required by the Delaware courts,
implicitly or otherwise, nor should they provide persuasive or
definitive evidence of satisfaction of either a board’s duty of care or
the fairness of a transaction. Rather, fairness opinions should be only
one factor, if at all, for the courts to consider in their analysis of an
acquiree board’s satisfaction of its duty of care in the corporate
control transaction decision. This more limited role for fairness
opinions is desirable only if fairness opinions are subject to
preparatory guidelines and standards, more fulsome disclosure
requirements, and limitations on egregious, conflicted practices.
These new strictures should be administered by a new, quasi-public
IBA. If these reforms are implemented, fairness opinions and their
underlying valuation analyses can become valuable instruments for
boards and stockholders considering a price offered or to be paid in
a corporate control transaction. This is particularly so if there is no
effective market-based process available to establish price. As an
added bonus, the adoption of these reforms should significantly
alleviate the often-cited problem of investment bank conflicts in the
provision of fairness opinions.
***

